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When Faith Falls Short:
Bankruptcy Decisions of Churches
PAMELA FOOHEY*
What does a church do when it is about to go bust? Religious
organizations, like any business, can experience financial distress.
Leaders could try to solve their churches’ financial problems on their
own. Perhaps leaders do not view the problems as addressable with
law. Or perhaps they do not think, as a moral or spiritual matter, that
they should resort to the legal system, such as bankruptcy, to deal with
their churches’ inability to pay its debts. Yet about ninety religious
organizations seek to reorganize under the Bankruptcy Code every
year. This Article relies on interviews with forty-five of these
organizations’ leaders and attorneys to examine how the leaders
conceptualized their churches’ financial distress as legal problems
and decided to address those legal problems with bankruptcy.
Through these inquiries, the Article sheds light on longstanding
questions about how people and organizations decide to use the legal
system versus doing nothing or solving problems through self-help.
The Article thus provides one of the first assessments of how small
organizations view their problems as legal problems, and the first
assessment of how leaders of small organizations decide to file for
bankruptcy.
Church leaders’ journeys began with struggling to solve their
congregations’ financial problems themselves and proclaiming that
“bankruptcy from a spiritual standpoint is a no-no.” Most often,
creditors’ foreclosure threats brought law to leaders’ attention.
Leaders then turned to social networks for help understanding their
legal options. Drawing from these results, the Article also scrutinizes
how leaders’ reliance on social networks and feelings of stigma and
shame because of their decisions to file influence debates about
restricting access to bankruptcy.
* Associate Professor, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. My thanks to
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I. INTRODUCTION
Pastor Taylor’s church is on the brink of financial meltdown. It has
foregone paying the mortgage on its building for the past three months in order
to keep up with other bills. Congregants have inklings that the church does not
have enough money, but they are hard-pressed to contribute more given their
own tight budgets. If only Pastor Taylor had a bit more time for finances to
improve and a bit less due to creditors every month. But right now the church
is about to go bust and he has to decide what to do.1
Does Pastor Taylor try to negotiate with the bank holding the mortgage?
Does he confess to his congregation the full extent of the church’s financial
problems in an effort to raise money? Does the church simply close? Or will
1 This anecdote is an amalgamation of stories from churches’ chapter 11 filings and

my interviews with pastors and attorneys who represented churches in their chapter 11
cases. See generally Pamela Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, 78 MO. L. REV. 719 (2013)
[hereinafter Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith]; Pamela Foohey, When Churches Reorganize,
88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 277 (2014) [hereinafter Foohey, When Chruches Reorganzie].
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Pastor Taylor authorize the church to file for bankruptcy despite having
preached that bankruptcy is absolutely not a choice for Christians?
This Article relies on my original research regarding religious
organizations2 that have filed chapter 11 bankruptcy cases to investigate how
leaders of these organizations come to see their institutions’ financial problems
as legal problems and as addressable by the particular legal solution of
reorganization.3 How these leaders decide between attempting to deal with
their organizations’ financial distress4 themselves versus turning to the legal
system sheds light on longstanding questions about how legal problems come
to the legal system. Indeed, Americans tend toward self-help as a matter of
pride or to avoid taking unpalatable legal action.
Consequently, in the United States, most civil justice problems are not
addressed with law.5 People, including small business owners, instead respond
by doing nothing or handling their problems themselves.6 For example, cattle
ranchers may not seek compensation from nearby ranchers when animals
trespass onto their land.7 Roller-derby skaters may rely on a privately
administered list of derby pseudonyms instead of turning to formal law to

2 As in my previous work, I use terms such as “faith-based organization,” “religious

institution,” and “religious organization” interchangeably and to mean any organization
whose operations are motivated in a meaningful way by faith-based beliefs and principles.
See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 277 n.1.
3 Most scholarship regarding the use of bankruptcy focuses on the financial problems
that underlie the need to file. See Ronald J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for
Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 291 (2010) (noting that “scant research” exists about the
decision to file for bankruptcy and exploring what leads households to seek bankruptcy
protection at the precise moment they file). My inquiry focuses on how leaders think about
organizations’ financial situations, posing new questions about how people and
organizations think about financial distress as a legal problem addressable with bankruptcy.
4 Financial distress occurs when a person or organization has difficulty timely paying
its financial obligations. See Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Normative Theory of Bankruptcy
Law: Bankruptcy As (Is) Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 951 n.91 (2004).
5 A “civil justice problem” is “one that has civil legal aspects and raises civil legal
issues, though the person who has the problem may never think of as it a legal problem and
may never take legal action to try to resolve it.” Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Fulcrum Point
of Equal Access to Justice: Legal and Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy, 42 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 949, 951 n.5 (2009) [hereinafter Sandefur, Fulcrum Point]; see, e.g., id. at 953
(noting that studies “reveal that the majority of [civil justice] problems never make it to
law, lawyers, or the civil justice system”); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence
and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
631, 649 (1980–81) (same).
6 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything: Understanding Moderate
Income Households’ Use of Lawyers’ Services, in MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE
222, 237–38 & fig.7.3 (Michael Trebilcock et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter Sandefur, Money
Isn’t Everything].
7 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 3 (1991) (observing farmers and cattle ranchers in Shasta County, California).
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regulate their intellectual property.8 A family that falls behind on its credit
card payments because of unexpected medical bills may not consider
bankruptcy as a potential avenue for relief.9
Research shows that people react to their civil justice problems based on
their body of knowledge and the options they believe are acceptable responses.
They may not know the law or think that the law is relevant.10 Even if they
know that law is relevant, resorting to law may not be on their list of options.11
That is, they may not think of their problems as “legal.”12
For some people, at some point, a legal option appears on the list of
possible actions. The groundbreaking “naming, blaming, claiming” framework
describes how people first must notice and name their injurious experiences,
then attribute those experiences to another party, and finally decide to make a
claim against that other party, possibly in a court of law.13
Thus, the “demand side” of law—“how people come to think about and
act on their potentially justiciable experiences”14—encompasses two distinct
questions. First, when and how do people view the problems they encounter in
their lives that raise legal issues as legal problems? Second, once people think
of their problems in legal terms, how do they decide to pursue particular legal
solutions?
This Article takes up these two questions in context of religious
organizations. Religious organizations are part of insular communities, and
thus their leaders may presume that members and others will help during times
of distress, causing leaders not to see their institutions’ financial problems as
legal problems.15 Nonetheless, approximately ninety religious organizations
file under chapter 11 every year.16
8 See David Fagundes, Talk Derby to Me: Intellectual Property Norms Governing

Roller Derby Pseudonyms, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1093, 1093 (2012) (examining how rollerderby skaters have created a “Master Roster” of the names under which they compete).
9 See Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Importance of Doing Nothing: Everyday Problems
and Responses of Inaction, in TRANSFORMING LIVES: LAW AND SOCIAL PROCESS 112, 123
(Pascoe Pleasence et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing]
(discussing why people often take no action to address money problems).
10 See Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 5, at 953–54.
11 See id. at 954.
12 See generally HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK
ABOUT GOING TO LAW (1999).
13 See Felstiner et al., supra note 5, at 635–36.
14 Catherine R. Albiston & Rebecca L. Sandefur, Expanding the Empirical Study of
Access to Justice, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 101, 117.
15 Leaders thus may turn to distinct and observable social networks in thinking about
their organizations’ problems. Also, at least as to the organizations that file under chapter
11, one leader typically holds the primary decision-making authority. See infra Part III.B.
This makes studying how religious organizations’ leaders think about their institutions’
financials problems a potentially fruitful setting to consider the “demand side” of law.
16 In my previous work, I reviewed documents submitted in connection with all the
chapter 11 cases filed by religious organizations between 2006 and 2011—approximately
500 cases. See generally Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1.
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The vast majority of debtors are small Christian congregations17 that faced
problems paying mortgages on church buildings.18 In many respects, their
cases were similar to those of small businesses, particularly in that the
organizations generally rose and fell with the effectiveness of a key leader.19
Ultimately, chapter 11 seemed to have the potential to provide a productive
means to preserve value and revive congregations.20
In addition, the religious organizations’ cases clustered in certain
geographic areas, with more than fifty percent of the cases filed in ten of a
possible ninety federal judicial districts.21 This filing distribution does not
reflect where chapter 11 cases are filed generally or where congregations are
located across the United States.22 Given this clustering, I hypothesized that
leaders may think about their organizations’ financial problems and the
decision to file bankruptcy similarly to how studies have found that people and
organizations respond to civil justice problems.
Part II of the Article analyzes research about how people come to the legal
system, including filing for bankruptcy. Notably, scholars have highlighted
that an individual’s decision to pursue legal remedies versus doing nothing or
taking matters into their own hands is “socially construed.”23 Information
gathered from friends, neighbors, and family members inform people’s notions
about whether their problems are legally addressable.24 These social networks
also lead people to attorneys and other legal service providers, who assist them
in deciding among their options.25
To test my hypothesis about how leaders decided to place their
organization in bankruptcy, as detailed in Part III, I conducted extensive
interviews with leaders of religious organizations that filed chapter 11 cases in
the ten “hot” districts and the attorneys who represented them. Part IV
analyzes these interviews to reveal leaders’ journeys from their churches’
impending financial meltdowns to reorganization. Consistent with research
17 I use the term “congregation” to mean a group of individuals—collectively, the

members or congregants—who meet together regularly for religious worship. See id. at 724
n.28.
18 Id. at 725–26.
19 Id. at 771–72.
20 See id. at 767–71; Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 303–04
(reaching the same conclusion by relying on interviews with bankruptcy attorneys to track
the post-bankruptcy experiences of religious institutions).
21 See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at 734–35.
22 See id.
23 Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 6, at 232; see also Felstiner et al.,
supra note 5, at 644–47. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON
PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998).
24 See Felstiner et al., supra note 5, at 644–47; Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 5,
at 953–54.
25 See Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 6, at 222; Paul DiMaggio &
Hugh Louch, Socially Embedded Consumer Transactions: For What Kinds of Purchases
Do People Most Often Use Networks?, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 619, 623 (1998).
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regarding how individuals experience their justiciable problems, leaders
initially chose to do nothing about their organization’s financial problem or to
turn to self-help techniques, such as approaching creditors themselves.
Only when creditors pushed for payment or when members or trusted
contacts brought law to their attention did their thoughts and actions begin to
change. Leaders then turned to other pastors, congregants, and friends to
confirm that the situations were legal problems and to discuss concerns about
what filing would say about themselves and their congregations. Leaders’
social networks also led them to attorneys, who discussed the benefits of
reorganization. With this information, leaders rationalized their decisions to
file, which allowed them to cope with their continued views of filing for
bankruptcy as stigmatized and shameful.
This analysis provides one of the first assessments of how organizations
come to the legal system and the first study of how small organizations’
leaders decide to file for bankruptcy. Part V of the Article connects this
analysis of the “demand side” of bankruptcy law to important larger questions
about the use of the American legal system, particularly when and how smaller
organizations turn to law. Further drawing on the results, Part V also
scrutinizes how the leaders’ reliance on social networks and feelings of stigma
and shame associated with filing for bankruptcy inform ongoing debates about
restricting access to bankruptcy.

II. LEGAL PROBLEMS AND LEGAL SOLUTIONS
Whether people will decide to address their justiciable problems through
particular legal remedies encompasses two distinct questions. First, do they
experience the problems as legal problems? This question considers the
recognition and social construction of problems: how people understand the
relevance of law to problems in their life. If people do not see problems as
legal, they are not likely to take legal actions. Second, once they come to see
their problems as having legal dimension, how do they evaluate the particular
legal avenues that may be available to address the problems?26 This question
considers the choice between the newly recognized legal solutions and other
options, such as doing nothing. This Part analyzes research addressing these
two questions in general and in the specific context of the decision to file for
bankruptcy.

26 Even if people choose to deal with their problems privately, law may affect their
negotiations and decisions. They may “bargain in the shadow of the law.” Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). Because this Article focuses on how a certain
group of people recognizes its financial problems as legal and decides to address them
through bankruptcy, it does not address how these people also may be “bargaining in the
shadow of the law.”
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A. How People Come to the Legal System
Research shows that most legal conflicts are resolved outside of the legal
system.27 Business owners may eschew drafting or renegotiating contracts to
preserve business relationships.28 Residents in suburban areas may “deny,
minimize, contain, and avoid conflict” with their neighbors.29 Importantly,
part of deciding whether to use law involves recognizing that another’s action
or a situation is a violation of a legally addressable right.
Focusing specifically on individuals, socio-legal scholars have found that
people often fail to perceive that a particular problem violates the law—that is,
they fail to name, blame, and claim the problem as legally actionable.30
Consequently, people may not mobilize their legal rights31 or invoke legal
norms to settle their disputes.32
Studies of how lower and moderate income individuals respond to their
justiciable problems demonstrate how people may or may not come to the
legal system.33 One of people’s most common responses to grievances is to do
nothing.34 People fail to take action because of shame, “a sense of insufficient
power,” and “frustrated resignation.”35 These feelings of shame and lack of
power also decrease individuals’ likelihood of taking the initial action of
seeking information about their options, including legal options.36
Alternatively, they may try to resolve the problems by appealing directly to the
other parties involved.37 Thus, though people may be aware of applicable

27 See supra note 5.
28 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A

Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) (interviewing forty-three companies and
six law firms in Wisconsin to explore the legal documentation of business transactions).
29 See M. P. BAUMGARTNER, THE MORAL ORDER OF A SUBURB 127–28 (1988)
(studying a suburban community and finding that people usually tend to avoid conflict).
30 See generally Felstiner et al., supra note 5; Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat,
Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 525 (1980–81) (conceptualizing the process of dispute generation as a pyramid).
31 Mobilization of the law generally refers to the “process by which legal norms are
invoked to regulate behavior.” Richard O. Lempert, Mobilizing Private Law: An
Introductory Essay, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 173, 173 (1976).
32 See generally EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 23 (identifying different categories of
legal consciousness that predict how a person will utilize the law in the face of a conflict).
33 Members of economically disadvantaged groups often are less able or likely to
mobilize their legally cognizable problems. See Calvin Morrill et al., Mobilization of Law,
in 13 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 590, 591
(James D. Wright ed., 2d ed. 2015). How they view their problems thus provides a good
lens to overview how people come to think of potentially justiciable problems as legal
problems.
34 Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 9, at 112.
35 Id. at 123.
36 Id. at 123–24.
37 Id. at 114.
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laws, they may not characterize their situations as addressable by law.38 As a
result, some problems effectively remain “alegal.”39
Individuals’ decisions to pursue legal remedies versus doing nothing also
are “socially construed.”40 The advice and actions of individuals in a person’s
social networks—“friends, neighbors, family members, and service providers
to whom they bring their troubles”41—strongly influence characterizations of
situations or disputes as legal or nonlegal. People may rely on leaders and
members of their community organizations, such as churches, for guidance
and information.42 These social networks play a complex and crucial role in
the transformation of problems with potential legal solutions into actual legal
problems.43 Gathering information through “social searching” may help
people think of their problems as legally addressable and lead them to
attorneys and other legal service providers.44
Conversely, the information may reinforce the construction of a particular
problem as not legal even if it may present a legal claim.45 Indeed, people do
not cite lack of knowledge itself as a reason for doing nothing,46 and likewise
do not implicate the cost of attorneys as the primary reason for failing to turn
to law to deal with justiciable problems.47 Rather, they learn to do nothing or
address problems outside the legal system from their previous experiences and
social context and networks.48

B. A Corollary: Diffusion of Legal Innovation Across Organizations
Similar ideas of social networks factor into theories of how legal and other
innovations spread through organizations. As detailed in the next Part, the
timing of religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases aligns better with the
38 For instance, people have reported not appealing decisions regarding payments
from federal insurance programs because they believed they could not prevail. Id. at 123.
39 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 5, at 953 (“The characterization of a specific
situation as a legal problem reflects . . . the thoughts and actions of the people who
experience the troubles . . . .”).
40 Id.; see also Felstiner et al., supra note 5, at 644–47.
41 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 5, at 953.
42 Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 9, at 114.
43 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 5, at 953.
44 See Sandefur, Money Isn’t Everything, supra note 6, at 222, 237–38 (noting that
studies of moderate income Americans find that households take about thirty percent of
their justiciable problems to lawyers and overviewing studies of how people find
attorneys).
45 Social constructions also impact the mobilization of law. See generally EWICK &
SILBEY, supra note 23.
46 Sandefur, Importance of Doing Nothing, supra note 9, at 126.
47 Sandefur, Fulcrum Point, supra note 5, at 954–55 (“[A lack of money to hire help]
is only one reason, and often not the primary one in people’s own accounts of why they
handle their problems as they do.”).
48 Id. at 954.
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timing of consumer than of business bankruptcy filings.49 The religious
organizations that use bankruptcy also usually grant control to one key
leader.50 These characteristics make studies of how people come to the legal
system a useful starting point in considering how religious organizations’
leaders think about law. However, as artificial entities with boards of trustees51
and pastors effectively serving as managers or chief executive officers,52
religious institutions are different than individuals. Studies of organizational
adoption of innovations offer another explanation for how religious
institutions’ leaders may decide to address their financial problems with the
legal solution of chapter 11.53
Researchers have characterized the diffusion of practices across
organizations as “a process of social construction.”54 Managers and directors,
in part, respond to changes in the legal, political, and social environment
through a combination of direct contact with their networks and indirect
observation of what other organizations have done.55 Empirical studies have
connected direct and indirect reliance on networks to the spread of the
adoption of poison pills and golden parachutes among corporations,56 the
adoption of formal employment discrimination complaint procedures for
nonunion employees in American companies without a direct government
49 See infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
50 See infra notes 136–39 and accompanying text.
51 As nonprofit entities, religious organizations should be governed by boards. See

Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 291 n.84; infra note 135 and
accompanying text.
52 See generally MARK L. GRIFFIN, PASTOR, CEO: MANAGING KINGDOM BUSINESS
(2010) (explaining that pastors need to have organizational and financial management
skills in today’s church environment); Gary William Kuhne & Joe F. Donaldson,
Balancing Ministry and Management: An Exploratory Study of Pastoral Work Activities,
37 REV. RELIGIOUS RES. 147 (1995) (studying five evangelical Protestant churches and
detailing the pastors’ multi-faceted work activities).
53 These theories and studies also address how organizations come to the legal system
because they consider how organizations adapt practices in response to changes in law or
legal innovation. See supra note 52.
54 Gerald F. Davis & Henrich R. Greve, Corporate Elite Networks and Governance
Changes in the 1980s, 103 AM. J. SOC. 1, 1–3 (1997).
55 See id. The idea that decision-makers in organizations rely on others’ actions
originates from broader work about “institutional isomorphism,” which seeks to explain
similarity among organizations. See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The
Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983).
56 Gerald F. Davis, Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill Through
the Intercorporate Network, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 583, 608 (1991) (finding that “the more a
firm was tied to others that had adopted a poison pill, the more likely it was to adopt a pill
itself (up to a point)”); Davis & Greve, supra note 54, at 33–34 (finding that golden
parachutes spread slowly through regional networks of corporate professionals, while
poison pills spread rapidly through shared directors, evidencing that both social ties among
firms and norms of professionals influence diffusion).
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mandate,57 and the abandonment of particular business strategies in the radio
station industry.58
These theories also are relevant to diffusion of practices across religious
institutions. A comparative study of local congregations referenced theories of
social contagion and mimicry among businesses to explain how churches rely
on the practices of other congregations and denominations to fashion their
programs and missions.59 Likewise, a study of the evolution of churches
allowing the ordination of women connected the diffusion of this practice
among groups of congregations and denominations with similar theological
orientations partly to the prior adoption of the practice by other
congregations.60 Similar to how churches and denominations accepted the
ordination of women, religious organizations’ leaders may communicate with
leaders of local churches or look to the practices of other congregations with
similar theologies in considering how to address their churches’ financial
problems.

C. How People Come to the Bankruptcy System
Particular to bankruptcy, these patterns of not thinking of problems as
legal and of relying on the social construction of problems are apparent in
studies of how social spillovers and context may influence consumer
bankruptcy filing rates. These studies respond to questions about the role of
bankruptcy’s stigma and shame in historically increasing rates of consumer
bankruptcy filings.61 Though the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code
57 Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and Organizational Governance: The
Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1401, 1435 (1990)
(concluding that “[o]ver time, processes of institutional isomorphism—mediated by the
personnel profession and by changing societal, legal, and managerial ideologies of
workplace governance—engendered a gradual diffusion of due process protections” in
American companies).
58 Henrich R. Greve, Jumping Ship: The Diffusion of Strategy Abandonment, 40
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 444, 468 (1995) (concluding that contagion among organizations was a
factor in the abandonment of a product-market strategy).
59 PENNY EDGELL BECKER, CONGREGATIONS IN CONFLICT: CULTURAL MODELS OF
LOCAL RELIGIOUS LIFE 180–203 (1999).
60 Mark Chaves, Ordaining Women: The Diffusion of an Organizational Innovation,
101 AM. J. SOC. 840, 865–66 (1996) (concluding that “[i]nterorganizational ties to prior
adopters powerfully affect diffusion” of the practice of ordaining women).
61 See, e.g., Michael D. Sousa, Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study, 87 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 435, 437 (2013) (discussing consumer bankruptcy filing rates over the last
forty years); Teresa A. Sullivan et al., Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An
Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in Bankruptcy Filings, 59 STAN. L. REV.
213, 214–15 (2006) (noting that there were 315,832 consumer bankruptcy filings in 1981
and 1,563,145 consumer bankruptcy filings in 2004); see also Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy
Stigma: Plausible Causes for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 488–517
(2006) (discussing why there may be a perceived shift in the social norm of bankruptcy
stigma since the 1960s).
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made it more difficult for individuals and families to file for bankruptcy,62
these amendments have not changed who files for bankruptcy,63 leading to
continued questions about bankruptcy’s enduring stigma and shame.64
“Social spillover” refers to how the actions of others in people’s
neighborhoods can influence their decisions.65 When individuals in a
neighborhood file for bankruptcy, others are likely to hear about the filings
either first or second hand.66 The ensuing information cascades may increase
people’s knowledge about the bankruptcy process, thereby prompting others to
view their financial problems as legal problems and lessening informational
barriers to filing.67 At the same time, others in the neighborhood may observe
that filing is a socially acceptable response to financial problems, thus
reducing the level of stigma attached to bankruptcy in that particular
geographic location and validating filing for bankruptcy as a productive

62 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L.

No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA] (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 11 & 28 U.S.C.); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the
Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of
Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1486–87 (2006) (describing BAPCPA’s “means
test,” which provides which consumers may file for bankruptcy); Sullivan et al., supra note
61, at 214 (noting that with the 2005 amendments, “the U.S. Congress has embraced
changes intended to make bankruptcy difficult or impossible for many financially troubled
Americans”).
63 See Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of
Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 352–53 (2008) (finding that BAPCPA
blocked families from filing “indiscriminately, regardless of their individual income
circumstances”).
64 See Sousa, supra note 61, at 437 (“The need to study bankruptcy stigma remains
relevant today.”). See also Rafael Efrat, The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma, 7
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 365 (2006), for a discussion of the historical treatment of
debtors, and infra Part V.B for a discussion of disentangling the related but distinct
concepts of stigma and shame in future debates about bankruptcy’s stigma.
65 See Astrid Dick et al., Social Spillovers in Personal Bankruptcies 1 (June 2008),
http://nyfedeconomists.org/topa/DLT_062808.pdf [http://perma.cc/UXN8-RQ3S].
66 See id. (describing the theorized effects of social spillovers); see also Ethan CohenCole & Burcu Duygan-Bump, Household Bankruptcy Decision: The Role of Social Stigma
vs. Information Sharing 1–3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. QAU08-6,
2008)
[hereinafter
Cohen-Cole
&
Duygan-Bump,
Role
of
Stigma],
https://www.bostonfed.org/bankinfo/qau/wp/2008/qau0806.pdf [http://perma.cc/38YZBMX6] (noting the social “phenomenon” of decreased costs of filing for bankruptcy
include information costs and social stigma); Scott Fay et al., The Household Bankruptcy
Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 706, 710 (2002) (same).
67 Dick et al., supra note 65, at 1 (discussing “informational channels”).
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solution.68 Higher filing rates should result from the diffusion of information
and shifting attitudes.69
Consistent with the theory, the results of several empirical studies of
consumer bankruptcy filings suggest that filing rates increase in a given year if
filing rates in the same geographic location rose in the prior year.70 However,
these studies do not differentiate the effect of information cascades from a
reduction in perceived stigma.71 Two more recent studies have sought to make
this distinction.72 They find that both increased knowledge and decreased
stigma impact the bankruptcy filing decision, but that information
dissemination may better explain filing trends.73
Social spillover theories closely relate to hypotheses about how social
capital may influence bankruptcy filings. Social capital refers to the “social
networks, norms, and cooperation and trust created by human interactions in a
community.”74 Communities that experience less migration, and thus have a
more stable population, may have stronger networks of citizens committed to

68 Id. (describing a “second channel” of social spillover related to stigma); Fay et al.,
supra note 66, at 710 (differentiating between “information cascades” and “local
differences in the level of bankruptcy stigma”).
69 Cohen-Cole & Duygan-Bump, Role of Stigma, supra note 66, at 2; Dick et al.,
supra note 65, at 1; Fay et al., supra note 66, at 710.
70 Dick et al., supra note 65, at 1 (finding some evidence of local spillover following
changes in state law making it easier to file); Fay et al., supra note 66, at 716 (predicting
that if a district experiences an increase in filings in one year, it will experience a greater
increase in filings the next year); David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical
Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 319, 339–40 (2002)
(finding that the “probability that someone files for bankruptcy increases with the number
of people in her state who filed in the recent past”).
71 See Ronald J. Mann, Optimizing Consumer Credit Markets and Bankruptcy Policy,
7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 395, 409 (2006) (noting that these studies do not “separate
the effect of stigma from a ‘learning-curve’ effect associated with increased awareness of
the bankruptcy process”). The studies also are criticized for defining neighborhoods
broadly and using proxies for stigma that may have economic effects that directly increase
individuals’ likelihood of filing for bankruptcy. See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and
State Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 614
(2006); Barry Scholnick, Bankruptcy Spillovers Between Close Neighbors 1 (Apr. 2013),
http://professor.business.ualberta.ca/barryscholnick/~/media/business/FacultyAndStaff/MBEL/
BarryScholnick/Documents/JournalArticles/BK_Neighbor_14Apr2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/
NM7P-VX67].
72 Cohen-Cole & Duygan-Bump, Role of Stigma, supra note 66, at 1–2;
Ethan Cohen-Cole & Burcu Duygan-Bump, Social Influence and Bankruptcy: Why Do So
Many Leave So Much on the Table? 1 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Cohen-Cole & DuyganBump, Social Influence and Bankruptcy], http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1423964
[http://perma.cc/XZ5Z-T8GC].
73 See generally Cohen-Cole & Duygan-Bump, Role of Stigma, supra note 66; CohenCole & Duygan-Bump, Social Influence and Bankruptcy, supra note 72.
74 Sumit Agarwal et al., Consumer Bankruptcy and Default: The Role of Individual
Social Capital, 32 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 632, 632 (2011).
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the communities’ prosperity.75 Residents’ drive to support the community in
turn may decrease the acceptability and incidence of bankruptcy filings.76
Social capital thus may both lead people not to conceptualize financial
problems as legal problems and counsel against using bankruptcy even if they
view their financial problems as legal.
Studies investigating how social capital affects consumer bankruptcy
filings overall find that factors pertaining to community stability, such as
mobility and rural residency, have statistically significant effects on filing
rates.77 Areas with greater population shifting, such as larger cities, should
experience higher filing rates.78 These results complement findings about
social spillover, further indicating that geographic location and social networks
may bear upon filing rates. Social capital theories also add nuance to
conclusions regarding social spillover, suggesting stigma and information
sharing may operate differently depending on location. For example,
information about bankruptcy may clarify individuals’ perception of their
financial problems as legal problems and make them more comfortable with
the bankruptcy process, yet social capital may counsel them against filing.

D. How People Decide Bankruptcy Is the Solution
Once leaders understand their religious organizations’ financial problems
as legally addressable, before they file for bankruptcy on behalf of their
organizations, they also must decide that bankruptcy law in particular is the
most viable tool to resolve the situations. Because there is no research into
how small businesses like religious organizations come to the bankruptcy
system, the most relevant literature is studies of consumer debtors. Prior
literature exploring how people choose bankruptcy from among their options
focuses on how people sort out what filing says about them.79 This process
75 Id. at 633–34; see F. H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27

J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 193–94 (1998).
76 Agarwal et al., supra note 74, at 633–34 (detailing how high social capital may
reduce consumer bankruptcy filings); Buckley & Brinig, supra note 75, at 193–94
(discussing how social capital may influence an individual’s propensity to file bankruptcy
based on her neighbors’ beliefs about bankruptcy).
77 See Agarwal et al., supra note 74, at 646 (concluding that “individual social capital
variables collectively can affect the strength of a community’s social networks and norms,
and, in turn, shape the community’s attitudes toward certain socioeconomic behaviors or
outcomes,” including filing for bankruptcy); Buckley & Brinig, supra note 75, at 200
(finding that “social variables,” defined as the strength of social networks, conservative and
hierarchical attitudes, and the social stigma of promise breaking, predict filing rates).
78 Buckley & Brinig, supra note 75, at 205 (concluding that this result is “consistent
with the hypothesis that filing rates are higher in regions where social networks are
weaker”).
79 Relatedly, some studies have investigated what prompts filings at a particular date
and time. See Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 292, 296–97 (finding that households file
when they save enough money to pay their attorneys and filing fees).
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encompasses two dimensions: people must realize the extent of their financial
declines and rationalize their decisions to file.
First, studies based on interviews with debtors, attorneys, and other legal
actors involved in the consumer bankruptcy system have considered the ways
in which individuals avoid dealing with their financial failure even if they
know that their situations are addressable through bankruptcy.80 People refuse
to answer debt collectors’ calls and otherwise evade the consequences of their
situations.81 As perceived by bankruptcy attorneys, eventually the
psychological toll of the reality of their predicaments allows for an “internal
reckoning with their own capacities to manage their financial
circumstances.”82 At that point, people admit to their often worsening financial
situations and accept bankruptcy as part of a solution.83
Interviews with consumer debtors link people’s perceptions of
bankruptcy’s stigma and shame with this realization process. Particularly
illuminating are direct interviews by Deborah Thorne and Leon Anderson of
couples who filed bankruptcy in 1999.84 The couples reported postponing
filing for months or even years to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy.85 They also
described hiding their bankruptcies post-filing from relatives and friends
because of fear of stigmatization.86 Most recently, Michael Sousa’s interviews
with consumer debtors who filed under chapter 7 between 2006 and 2010 also
revealed that some individuals avoided filing for bankruptcy because of its
stigma and the shame they felt more generally about incurring debts that were
unable to repay.87
Second, individuals may need to rationalize filing for bankruptcy, a
process distinct from recognizing the gravity of their predicaments.
80 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many

Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 540–43 (1993) (detailing consumer debtor attorneys’
perspectives on their client’s feelings and attitudes toward bankruptcy); Terrell A. Hayes,
Stigmatizing Indebtedness: Implications for Labeling Theory, 23 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION
29, 29 (2000) (interviewing forty-six individuals who attended Debtors Anonymous);
Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 313–18 (discussing results of interviews with consumer
bankruptcy attorneys); Sousa, supra note 61, at 462 (interviewing fifty-eight consumer
debtors); Deborah Thorne & Leon Anderson, Managing the Stigma of Personal
Bankruptcy, 39 SOC. FOCUS 77, 77 (2006) (interviewing thirty-seven newly bankrupt
families).
81 See Braucher, supra note 80, at 541 (noting attorney statements that “[m]any
debtors struggle with huge debts for a long time before visiting a bankruptcy lawyer”);
Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 313–14 (describing the “ostrich defense”); Thorne &
Anderson, supra note 80, at 86 (detailing how debtors avoided bill collectors).
82 Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 316; see also Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80,
at 83 (detailing how several debtors reported that as their financial problems worsened they
“sank into serious self-described depression”).
83 Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 317.
84 See generally Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80.
85 Id. at 86 (detailing how debtors described trying to avoid bankruptcy).
86 Id. at 86–87.
87 Sousa, supra note 61, at 463–69.
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Rationalization is a psychological mechanism whereby individuals justify their
decisions to solve the cognitive dissonance they experience when their actions
do not align with their beliefs.88 People may justify their actions both at the
time events are occurring and after they have acted.89 In the latter instance, a
tendency to distort memories to reduce cognitive dissonance may play a key
role in how individuals ex post perceive their decisions in relation to how they
believe they and others should behave.90 Also, in justifying the rightness of
their actions, people may distance themselves from the moral implications of
their behavior, a process termed “moral disengagement.”91 This process may
include comparing one’s actions to other’s more reprehensible behavior and
placing the responsibility for one’s actions on another person or groups of
people.92
There is limited empirical evidence linking cognitive dissonance and
rationalization to consumer debtors’ use of bankruptcy. Most prominently,
Thorne’s and Anderson’s, as well as Sousa’s interviews with consumer
debtors revealed that the debtors engaged in multiple methods of “deviance

88 See, e.g., LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 73–74 (1957)

(noting that “rationalization” refers to the “process of justification for the choice after its
completion to satisfy oneself rather than of affording logical presentation of reasons to
influence the process beforehand”); CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE
MADE (BUT NOT BY ME) 4, 13 (2007) (“Self-justification . . . allows us to create a
distinction between our moral lapses and someone else’s, and to blur the discrepancy
between our actions and our moral convictions.”); Ruth Thibodeau & Elliot Aronson,
Taking a Closer Look: Reasserting the Role of the Self-Concept in Dissonance Theory, 18
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 591, 591 (1992) (noting that cognitive dissonance is
most bothersome when it disrupts people’s conceptions of themselves).
89 See TAVRIS & ARONSON, supra note 88, at 20–21 (“Dissonance theory came to
explain far more than the reasonable notion that people are unreasonable at processing
information. . . . Once we make a decision, we have all kinds of tools at our disposal to
bolster it.”).
90 See id. at 6, 70–71 (“Memories are often pruned and shaped by an ego-enhancing
bias that blurs the edges of past events, softens culpability, and distorts what really
happened.”); Michael Ross, Relation of Implicit Theories to the Construction of Personal
Histories, 96 PSYCHOL. REV. 341, 355 (1989) (discussing how people use implicit theories
of themselves to construct personal histories that produces biases in their recollection of
past events).
91 See, e.g., Albert Bandura et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the
Exercise of Moral Agency, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 364, 364 (1996)
(discussing how people may selectively deactivate their moral standards when engaging in
conduct they view as reprehensible); Lisa L. Shu et al., Dishonest Deed, Clear Conscience:
When Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 331 (2011) (noting theories of how people
“modify their beliefs about [their] questionable actions through moral disengagement” and
linking those theories with cognitive dissonance).
92 See Bandura et al., supra note 91, at 365–66 (discussing how people morally justify
their actions).
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avowal” to justify their filings.93 Debtors distanced themselves from other
debtors by citing their “legitimate” reasons for declaring bankruptcy94 and
made excuses for their situations.95 They also tried to “transcend” their filings
by stating that they planned to repay creditors or teach others about managing
their finances.96
The interviews with religious organizations’ leaders and attorneys
analyzed in Part IV connect these theories and evidence regarding how people
and organizations come to law generally and bankruptcy specifically to
religious institutions’ use of chapter 11. Part III sets the stage for this analysis
by detailing the underlying data.

III. RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS’ APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY
My previous investigation of religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases
through their filings led to the research questions investigated in this Article.
This Part begins by describing the quantitative data collection and the
development of the research question. It then discusses the interviews.

A. Quantitative Filing Data
To explore how religious organizations use chapter 11 to deal with
financial distress and what their cases reveal about business reorganization and
the bankruptcy process, I created a database of the universe of religious
organizations that filed under chapter 11 nationwide from the January 1, 2006,
to December 31, 2011, based on data available via the Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) service. As described in my prior work, I
identified 497 chapter 11 cases filed by 454 unique religious organizations
spanning the study’s six year timeframe.97
93 Sousa, supra note 61, at 469–81 (detailing how debtors psychologically distanced

themselves from their financial situations and bankruptcy filings); Thorne & Anderson,
supra note 80, at 87–93 (noting that “while debtors acknowledged the general
wrongfulness of bankruptcy, they endeavored to separate the stigmatized act from the
deviant role with which it was generally associated”).
94 Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 87–90; see also Sousa, supra note 61, at
470–73, 477–79.
95 Sousa, supra note 61, at 470–72, 475–77.
96 Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 92–93. Interviews with consumer debtor
attorneys augment these findings. See Braucher, supra note 80, at 541–42.
97 For a detailed description of the methodology used to assemble the dataset, see
Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at 730–32. Of note, I combined jointly
administered cases and eliminated cases filed by Catholic dioceses and those of
organizations that duplicate services provided in the private market. The Catholic dioceses’
and related entities’ cases stem from sex abuse allegations and most likely ultimately
represent an effort to handle widespread litigation. See Jonathan C. Lipson, When Churches
Fail: The Diocesan Debtor Dilemmas, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 363–65 (2005) (analogizing
the diocese cases to mass tort bankruptcy cases). Those debtors that duplicated services
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An analysis of their cases revealed that religious organization leaders’
“social construction” of bankruptcy may have influenced their approach to
using reorganization. First, fifty-one percent of the cases in the dataset
originated in ten of a possible ninety federal districts.98 These districts do not
coincide with either the districts in which most chapter 11 cases generally
were filed during the study’s timeframe,99 the distribution of chapter 7 or
chapter 13 cases across the country during the study’s timeframe,100 or the
concentration of religious organizations across the United States.101 This
suggests that the concentration of religious organization bankruptcies was not
a mere artifact of the geographic locations of chapter 11 cases filings or
religious organizations. Table 1 lists the ten districts with the greatest
percentages of religious organization cases filed nationwide during the study
timeframe and compares them to the percentages of total chapter 11 cases filed
during the same timeframe and percentages of total congregations nationwide
located in those districts.

provided in the private market included senior living communities, YMCAs, and hospitals.
Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at 731–32.
98 In creating the dataset, I searched filings from bankruptcy courts located in the fifty
United States and the District of Columbia. Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at
730. Of the ninety possible federal districts, the cases in the dataset came from sixty-nine.
Id. at 734.
99 Forty-eight percent of all chapter 11 cases filed during the study’s timeframe came
from ten districts. Four of these districts are among the districts from which the majority of
religious organizations’ cases originated. Id. at 734 n.90.
100 Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 280 n.19.
101 Because many have few members and lack permanent locations, determining the
precise number of religious organizations nationwide is difficult. The Association of
Statisticians of American Religious Bodies’ censuses provide the most comprehensive
data. See Ass’n of Statisticians of Am. Religious Bodies, 2010 U.S. Religion Census: Links
and Rankings (All Years), RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS & MEMBERSHIP STUDY (RCMS)
(2012), http://www.rcms2010.org/compare.php [http://perma.cc/E4HB-86PT] [hereinafter
2010 U.S. Religion Census]. The 2010 study estimated that there are approximately
345,000 congregations in the country. ASSOCIATION OF STATISTICIANS OF AMERICAN
RELIGIOUS BODIES, U.S. RELIGIOUS CENSUS 2010: SUMMARY FINDINGS 6 (May 2012),
http://www.rcms2010.org/press_release/ACP%2020120501.pdf [http://perma.cc/PY3HWTCR]. Five of the ten districts with highest concentrations of congregations are among
those with the most religious organization filings during the study timeframe: Central
District of California, Middle District of Florida, Northern District of Illinois, and Southern
and Western Districts of Texas. Congregations tend to be spread more evenly across the
United States, with no more than three percent of total nationwide congregations located in
any one federal district. See id.
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Table 1: Ten Districts with Greatest Percentages of Religious Organization
Filings During Study Timeframe102
Religious
Organization Cases
District
N
%
N.D. Georgia
53
10.7
M.D. Florida
38
7.7
W.D. Tennessee
27
5.4
C.D. California
24
4.8
N.D. Texas
22
4.4
S.D. Texas
21
4.2
D. Maryland
18
3.6
N.D. Illinois
18
3.6
E.D. N. Carolina
17
3.4
S.D. Florida
16
3.2
Total
254
51.1

All Chapter 11
Cases
N
%
1,791
2.9
2,879
4.7
323
0.5
4,791
7.8
1,868
3.1
1,684
2.8
1,210
2.0
1,504
2.5
1,689
2.8
697
1.1
18,436 30.1

Congregations
N
5,830
9,093
2,861
10,750
8,796
7,438
5,336
6,215
6,065
3,977
66,361

%
1.7
2.6
0.8
3.1
2.6
2.2
1.6
1.8
1.8
1.2
19.3

Second, within the ten districts with the greatest percentages of filings,
many of the organizations that sought to reorganize were located relatively
near to each other. For instance, despite including the metropolitan area of
Athens, all but one of the forty-five unique religious organizations that filed in
the Northern District of Georgia were located around the city of Atlanta.103 In
contrast, the Athens area is home to about five percent of the total
congregations in the metropolitan areas of Athens and Atlanta.104
Likewise, in the Central District of California, nine (38%) of the twentyfour debtors were located near South Los Angeles. The Central District of
California includes Los Angeles County, which encompasses many other
heavily populated areas besides South Los Angeles. All of Los Angeles
102 Where applicable, I report “N” for the number of cases, debtors, or congregations.
In Table 1, N for Religious Organization Cases Filed is 497, and N for All Chapter 11
Cases Filed is 61,260, and N for Congregations is 344,894. Data regarding religious
organization chapter 11 cases are from my original dataset. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. Data regarding all chapter 11 cases are from the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts (AO). Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics.aspx [http://perma.cc/Q3B8-VB9P].
Data regarding congregations are from the 2010 U.S. Religion Census, supra note 101.
103 The outlier is a ministry located in Texas that filed in the Northern District of
Georgia. Eight organizations filed more than once during the study timeframe. See supra
note 102.
104 The 2010 U.S. Religion Census: Religious Congregations & Membership Study
also reports the number of congregations in metropolitan areas. The Athens metropolitan
area is home to 224 congregations, while the Atlanta metropolitan area is home to 4,529
congregations. 2010 U.S. Religion Census, supra note 101.
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County is home to about half of the congregations in the Central District of
California, suggesting that religious organizations located within the South
Los Angeles area file disproportionately.105
Similarly, all but two (90%) of the nineteen debtors that filed in the
Northern District of Illinois were in the metropolitan area of Chicago.106 This
area generally includes counties where only 75% of the congregations in the
Northern District of Illinois are located.107 These statistics provide some
indication that religious organizations not only filed in particular districts, but
also that their locations within those districts clustered around certain
metropolitan areas, suggesting that social spillovers and norms partially may
have driven the distribution.
Third, particular attorneys handled a sizable proportion of the cases filed
in some of these ten districts. Most revealing of this phenomenon is who
represented the religious organizations that filed in the Western District of
Tennessee. Of the twenty-seven cases, three attorneys each represented five or
six debtors. Certain attorneys handled a sizable minority of cases in other
districts as well. One attorney handled five (36%) of the fourteen cases filed
with counsel in the Eastern District of North Carolina, and one attorney
represented the debtor in eight (18%) of forty-four cases filed with counsel in
the Northern District of Georgia.108 Though the number of attorneys that
accept business chapter 11 debtor clients in their districts may impact the
distribution of cases among attorneys, social networks and referral systems
whereby the religious organizations talked with each other about bankruptcy
before filing also may have influenced the distribution.
Fourth, the affiliations of the religious organization debtors spanned a
variety of religious beliefs and reflected the general makeup of religious
congregations in America, with more than 90% of debtors affiliated with
Christianity.109 However, the composition of Christian affiliated debtors did
not mirror the breakdown of Christian congregations by denomination in
America.110 Many of the Christian affiliated debtors were nondenominational
or congregationalist.111 These organizations often independently and
autonomously run their own affairs.112 This may have left these churches with
fewer options when they encountered financial problems, which may have
105 Of the 10,750 congregations in the Central District of California, 5.773 are located

in Los Angeles County. 2010 U.S. Religion Census, supra note 101.
106 One debtor was located near the Missouri border. The other was located 90 miles
west of Chicago. See supra note 102.
107 Of the 6,215 congregations in the Northern District of Illinois, 4,650 are located in
Cook, DuPage, Lake, and Will Counties. 2010 U.S. Religion Census, supra note 101.
108 In nine cases filed in the Northern District of Georgia, the debtors did not retain
counsel before filing. Likewise, in three cases filed in the Eastern District of Carolina, the
debtors did not retain counsel before filing. See supra note 102.
109 Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at 737 tbl.2.
110 Id. at 737.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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lead them to file for bankruptcy in greater numbers than those congregations
affiliated with other Christian denominations.113 Simultaneously, leaders of
organizations with similar denominations and operating structures may have
talked with each other about their organizations’ financial problems, resulting
in certain denominations filing more frequently. Likewise, when leaders read
or heard about similar congregations filing under chapter 11, they may have
been more likely to consider law and bankruptcy as a solution to their
congregations’ financial problems, analogous to how churches decided to
allow the ordination of women.114
Finally, oftentimes one pastor held the ultimate decision authority.115
These pastors’ ability to direct their congregations may have made their
decisions to place their churches into chapter 11 more akin to consumer
debtors’ decisions to file for bankruptcy. Bolstering this theory, increases and
decreases in religious organizations’ filings over the study timeframe did not
track with increases and decreases in business bankruptcy filings over the
same timeframe.116 Rather, as depicted in Figure 1, their filings generally
increased as consumer bankruptcy filings increased, and decreased between
2012 and 2013 along with consumer filings.117 Indeed, their filings appear to

113 Id.; Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 284–86 (discussing how

a specific religious organization’s denomination or lack of affiliation may impact its
leader’s tendency to consider filing for bankruptcy).
114 See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 136–41 and accompanying text; see also Foohey, When Churches
Reorganize, supra note 1, at 287–90 (discussing whether churches of various sizes and
with differing member demographics vest decisional authority with lead pastors).
116 See Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at 733 fig.1.
117 I used the same criteria and procedure to identify religious organizations’ chapter
11 filings for 2012 and 2013 as I did to create the study dataset. See supra note 97 and
accompanying text. Consumer bankruptcy filing data is based on data reported by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO). Caseload Statistics Data Tables,
supra note 102. To calculate consumer bankruptcy filings per year, I combined total
chapter 7 filings in which the predominate nature of reported debt was nonbusiness with
total chapter 13 filings in which the predominate nature of reported debt was nonbusiness.
As with religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases, I included filings in the fifty United
States and the District of Columbia. Because of bankruptcy attorneys’ practices, these
figures may overestimate consumer bankruptcy filings slightly. See Robert M. Lawless &
Elizabeth Warren, The Myth of the Disappearing Business Bankruptcy, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
743, 763 (2005) (finding that attorneys routinely indicate on petitions that individual
debtors’ cases stem from predominately consumer debts when they arise from
predominately business debts). Assuming that attorneys’ practices remained constant from
2006 to 2013, the comparison between consumer and religious organization cases should
not be affected.
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lag behind consumer filings by one year, perhaps because consumers’ finances
heavily influenced religious organizations’ financial problems.118

160
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Religious Organization Cases

Combined Chapter 7 and 13 Cases

Religious Organization Cases

Figure 1: Combined Chapter 7 and 13 Cases with Predominately Consumer
Debts versus Religious Organization Chapter 11 Cases Filed by Year

Chapter 7 and 13 Cases

Of course, other explanations of the clumping of religious organizations’
chapter 11 filings besides social networks, spillovers, and contagion remain.
The congregations that sought bankruptcy protection may have had relatively
fewer members, impacting their ability to weather financial problems.119 Or
the religious organizations that filed may have been located in economically
depressed areas or areas in which populations shifted, making these churches

Figure 1 presents the following data regarding cases filed per year:
Year
Religious
Organization
Cases

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

42

71

87

85

96

116

107

89

Combined
chapter 7 and 592,070
13 Cases

814,317

1,064,444 1,400,163 1,522,634 1,349,995 1,169,271 1,026,236

118 One of the main reasons cited by religious organizations for their financial declines

was a decrease in tithes and offerings because of the Great Recession’s impact on their
members’ finances. Foohey, Bankrupting the Faith, supra note 1, at 757–59.
119 See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 288 (noting that scholars
and attorneys have suggested that a church’s size may limit its sustainability and growth).
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more susceptible to economic fluctuations or decreasing membership.120
Certain congregations may not have emphasized contributing as much as
others, rendering these churches more likely to file for bankruptcy because
their members were less prepared to use their own funds to help the
congregation. Likewise, inexperienced or less business savvy pastors may
have led many of the organizations that filed. That these churches were located
in the same geographic areas may have been mere coincidence. Competition
among churches in a given area itself may have created the clumping, with a
number of churches vying for members from the same pools of households.
Competition may have caused some of these churches’ financial problems and
eventual bankruptcy filings.
Nonetheless, considered together, the distribution of religious
organizations’ cases suggests that social spillovers and norms in part may have
driven the filings. Given this, I hypothesized that the organizations’ leaders
may approach the decision to seek bankruptcy protection similar to the ways in
which people generally come to the legal system, including by way of social
networks.

B. Qualitative Interview Data
To test this hypothesis, I interviewed leaders and attorneys involved in a
sample of the religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases originating from the
ten judicial districts with the greatest percentages of filings.121 I focused on
these ten “hot” districts because if social networks or norms partially are
driving filings, the phenomena logically will be evident where filings cluster.
Also, gathering in-depth data from a limited number of districts minimizes the
chances that the findings stem from individual characteristics of the cases
rather than fixed effects of the districts, and also presented the best way to
gather data in light of limits of time and money.
Preferably, I also would have interviewed leaders from organizations in
similar financial distress whose congregations did not file for bankruptcy.
However, it is incredibly expensive at best and infeasible at worst to identify
the population of similarly situated religious institutions that did not seek to
reorganize.122 Even locating congregations post-bankruptcy and obtaining
120 This may be particularly true as regards the physical proximity of religious

organization debtors within districts.
121 Qualitative research seeks to “describe and explain persons’ experiences, behaviors,
interactions and social contexts” by focusing on a small group of people and without
relying on statistical models. Ellie Fossey et al., Understanding and Evaluating Qualitative
Research, 36 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. PSYCHIATRY 717, 717 (2002). As such, qualitative research
is not generalizable to a larger population probabilistically, but rather is concerned with
“the applicability of [its] findings, based on how the nature and processes involved in
experiences generalize.” Id. at 730.
122 See Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 302 (“There is simply no access point to the
population of those in financial distress paralleling the public availability of data about
bankruptcy debtors.”).

2015]

WHEN FAITH FALLS SHORT

1341

interviews with their leaders proved difficult. The interviews with attorneys
thus supplement the interviews with the organizations’ leaders, together
providing a more comprehensive picture of how the leaders thought about
addressing their financial problems with bankruptcy.
To solicit interviews, I mailed potential respondents a letter that detailed
the study and asked for their help by agreeing to speak with me about their
organization’s case or their experiences in handling chapter 11 cases filed by
religious institutions.123 Approximately one week after they received the letter,
I called each debtor or attorney and requested their participation.124 I
conducted all of the interviews over the telephone based on scripted openended questions.125 Participants did not receive compensation.126

1. Religious Organizations’ Leaders
In the ten districts with the greatest percentages of cases during the study
timeframe, 229 unique institutions filed for bankruptcy. Three of these debtors
were led by the same individual as another debtor, leaving 226 unique leaders
to potentially interview.127 Of those leaders, I successfully contacted ninety-

123 Mailing addresses came from the debtors’ bankruptcy filings. I verified and
updated the addresses via Internet searches of the debtors’ operating names and the names
of the debtors’ leaders and attorneys as disclosed on their chapter 11 petitions.
124 Phone numbers came from the debtors’ bankruptcy filing records. I verified and
updated the phone numbers via Internet searches of the debtors’ operating names and the
names of the debtors’ leaders and attorneys as disclosed on their chapter 11 petitions.
125 As with other studies based on semi-structured interviews, I generally followed the
script, but occasionally asked questions out of order or asked follow-up questions. See,
e.g., Braucher, supra note 80, at 512–13 (interviewing bankruptcy attorneys and trustees
“using non-directive, open-ended questions, not always phrased the same way or asked in
the same order”); Sara Sternberg Greene, The Broken Safety Net: A Study of Earned
Income Tax Credit Recipients and a Proposal for Repair, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 515, 528–29
(2013) (describing methodology for a study assessing the earned income tax credit program
based on interviews with program recipients); Angela Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of
Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451,
503–05 (2007) (describing methodology for interviews with low-income women to
investigate the effect of usury restrictions).
One interview with a leader was conducted in March 2014. All other interviews
took place between April and July of 2013. Each of the respondents allowed me to audio
record the interview. I transcribed and coded all of the interviews myself. To preserve the
interviewees’ anonymity, I omit identifying details. Instead, I identify each interview
subject with a descriptive title such as “Central California Attorney One” or “Central
California Leader One.”
126 Prior to soliciting interviews, I obtained approval of the interview and data
retention procedures from the University of Illinois’s Institutional Review Board.
127 All three of these leaders opened another church with a different incorporation and
operating name after the chapter 11 cases of their previous religious organization ended.
Though the three leaders are the same people, the organizations are unique debtor entities.
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three (41%).128 Ten of those leaders agreed to speak with me, for a response
rate of 11%. The interviews ranged from twenty to eighty minutes, with a
median of forty minutes.
Several factors may contribute to this low response rate. Given that many
of the religious organizations were small, some of them may have employed
their leaders and staff on a part-time basis.129 Reaching these organizations
offered additional challenges.130 In addition, most religions, including
Christianity, have some religious writings that condemn bankruptcy.131
Though the organizations ultimately filed for bankruptcy, their leaders may
have been more reticent than other bankruptcy filers to discuss their cases
publicly. Similarly, as an outsider to the congregations, the leaders may not
have been inclined to speak with me.
The ten interviewed leaders’ religious organizations were located in five of
the ten federal districts. Three leaders’ organizations were from the Central
District of California, three debtors came from the Middle District of Florida,
and another two organizations were located in the Western District of
Tennessee. The remaining two debtors came from the Northern District of
Georgia and Northern District of Illinois. Nine of the leaders were senior
pastors and effective CEOs of their churches; the other leader headed the
church’s trustee board.132 Consistent with the breakdown of the religious
organization debtors’ affiliations, all the leaders’ organizations were Christian
churches, most of which were nondenominational or congregationalist.133
Nine of the ten churches were predominately black.134
All of the churches’ governing structures included boards that the leaders
were part of or with whom the leaders were required to discuss issues

128 The other 133 leaders’ organizations’ phones were disconnected and, to the extent
that the letters were not returned as undeliverable, the leaders did not respond to the mailed
letters on their own initiative.
129 Attorneys mentioned difficulties in communicating with the debtors’ leadership and
staff because of the part-time nature of employment. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with
Middle Fla. Att’y Three 4 (May 8, 2013) (“These people have other jobs, and yet they’re
representing [the] church.”); Telephone Interview with S. Tex. Att’y Two 3 (June 17,
2013) (noting that one of the religious organization debtors was led by “one of these
ministers who was preaching on Sunday and running a construction company during the
week”).
130 Though I called each debtor at least three times, including on weekends, I often left
voicemail messages.
131 See Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV.
141, 167 (1998) (“Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism clearly foster in their
believers a moral code that emphasizes the importance of debt-repayment, and hence, the
avoidance of bankruptcy at all costs.”).
132 See infra note 136.
133 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
134 See Foohey, When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 286–87 (discussing the
racial demographic skew and noting that it bears further study).
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regarding the churches’ finances.135 However, eight of the ten pastors had the
authority to make the final decision regarding the bankruptcy filing, even if
they technically consulted with the board.136 The attorneys I interviewed
confirmed that many of the religious organizations that contacted them
regarding bankruptcy were Black Churches137 of nondenominational or
congregationalist Christian affiliations,138 and that typically, the senior pastor
effectively held the ultimate decision-making authority regarding filing for
bankruptcy.139 Additionally, many of the religious organization debtors listed
the “authorized individual” as a senior pastor, suggesting that in these cases,
the pastor occupied a position that included decision-making authority.140
Indeed, in a majority of these cases, the pastor’s listed title also included
135 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One 1 (Apr. 18, 2013)
(“We have a group of trustees, individuals of the church, . . . and we are the ones that make
the decisions when it comes to any kind of financial decisions that need to be made for the
church.”); Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One 2 (May 6, 2013) (noting that
certain financial decisions go through the board of finance and the interviewed leader);
Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two 2 (Mar. 17, 2014) (noting that along with
pastoring, the leader serves as chairperson of the board and leads all board meetings); see
also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
136 Five pastors indicated that they had the final say about major decisions. Three
pastors said that there was discussion among board members regarding the decision to file,
but they also indicated that their thoughts were crucial to major decisions. One pastor was
from a large denominational church with a clear decision-making structure that included,
but was not guided by, the pastor. The final leader was the chair of the board that made the
decision to file; under this church’s structure, the pastor was selected by the board and the
pastor’s sole function was to pastor.
137 “Black Church” refers to predominately black congregations and includes
historically African American congregations and predominately black churches in white
denominations. See C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1 (1990).
138 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Three 5 (Apr. 22, 2013) (“I
deal with black churches.”); Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Att’y Three 1 (June 20,
2013) (noting that all four churches represented were black churches); Telephone Interview
with E. N.C. Att’y Three 2–3 (May 15, 2013) (noting that “[a]ll of these [debtors] that I’ve
mentioned have black congregations” and that they all were nondenominational);
Telephone Interview with S. Tex. Att’y Two, supra note 129, at 2 (“Without exception,
they are all black churches. All of them. And they’re all congregationalist churches.”).
139 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Att’y Three, supra note 138, at 2 (noting
that all the represented churches had boards, but that “the day to day decision making in
pretty much all of the cases had been made by the pastor”); Telephone Interview with N.
Ill. Att’y Five 2 (May 16, 2013) (noting that a represented church had a board, but recalling
that it was not “any issue” and that the pastor ran the church); Telephone Interview with W.
Tenn. Att’y Three 2 (May 15, 2013) (noting that the represented churches “were really
pastor driven”). But see Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Att’y Six 2 (May 28, 2013)
(noting that in representing a Lutheran church, the attorney dealt with the congregation’s
president, not the pastor).
140 In a case filed by an artificial entity, the debtor’s “authorized individual” must sign
the petition for bankruptcy. Voluntary Petition, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_001.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZNY3-8ZTZ].
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President or CEO, further suggesting that the pastor’s opinion was pivotal to
decision-making.141
Though the response rate is low, based on attorneys’ experiences and the
breakdown of the religious organizations that filed during the study timeframe,
the composition of the interviewed leaders and their churches seems consistent
with the general makeup of religious institutions seeking to reorganize under
chapter 11. In addition, the attorney interviews supplement and confirm the
leaders’ responses, suggesting that I reached a representative, though small
sample of the religious organizations’ leaders. Even so, an obvious limitation
of the data collected in these interviews is that the experiences of the leaders
interviewed may not be generalizable to other religious organization debtors
and leaders.

2. Attorneys
A total of 168 attorneys represented the 229 unique institutions in
connection with their 254 chapter 11 cases filed in the ten districts with the
greatest percentages of filings during the study timeframe. I randomly selected
ninety (54%) of these attorneys to send letters.142 Seven of these attorneys had
moved firms and were not locatable.143 Of the remaining, I interviewed thirtyfive attorneys, for a response rate of 42%.144 The interviews ranged from
twenty to sixty minutes, with a median of thirty-five minutes, largely
depending on the number of cases handled by the attorney.
The interviewed attorneys were spread relatively evenly across the ten
districts, represented a range of the religious organizations that filed during the
study timeframe, and operated diverse legal practices. By district, six of the
attorneys practiced in the Central District of California, six practiced in the
Middle District of Florida, two practiced in the Southern District of Texas, and
three practiced in each of the other districts. The interviewed attorneys handled
the cases of a total of fifty-eight religious organizations that filed during the
study timeframe and an additional twelve cases filed by religious institutions
outside the study timeframe. They generally represented congregations with
affiliations that corresponded to the breakdown of the types of religious
entities that filed under chapter 11 during the study timeframe.145
141 See also supra note 52 and accompanying text.
142 I randomly selected attorneys from each district. I did not sample equally from the

districts because of the disparity in the number of attorneys who represented debtors in
those districts. My goal was to speak to roughly equal numbers of attorneys from each
district. The random selection yielded a regionally diverse pool of interviewees.
143 These attorneys seemingly either had left law practice or moved to government or
in-house positions. Regardless, the letters I sent were returned as undeliverable and I could
not find active telephone numbers for them, rendering them unreachable.
144 I called each attorney three times.
145 The attorneys also generally matched the population of attorneys who represented
religious organizations in cases filed in the ten districts with the greatest percentages of
filings based on the limited data regarding attorneys that can be gleaned from case
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The attorneys concentrated their practices on bankruptcy and related
services. Their practices were debtor oriented, though some predominately
represented individuals with consumer debts, while others primarily
represented small businesses and individuals with business debts. The
diversity of the attorneys and of their religious organization clients suggests
that I interviewed a representative sample of attorney. Nonetheless, in
considering the results of the interviews, it is important to remain cognizant of
the possibility that I reached a nonrepresentative sample of attorneys.

IV. FROM FINANCIAL DISTRESS TO BANKRUPTCY
Religious organizations facing financial distress arrived at the decision to
file for bankruptcy through a complex and often lengthy process. Their leaders
rarely considered law in general or bankruptcy in particular as a solution to the
problems until the leaders recognized the severity of their churches’ situations,
talked with people in their social networks to confirm that the situations were
addressable with law and bankruptcy, learned more about the bankruptcy
process, and came to terms with what filing said about themselves and their
congregations. Congregations’ leaders applied the same information and
similar thinking to update their beliefs about the legal nature of their
organizations’ financial problems, their understandings of the chapter 11
process, and their perceptions of how peers would view their decisions to file
bankruptcy. The remainder of this Part divides leaders’ process of deciding to
place their churches in bankruptcy into four interconnected pieces. In doing so,
it highlights how the process is consistent with the theories and limited studies
detailed in Part II addressing how individuals and organizations come to the
legal system. It then synthesizes the process to provide an overview of how
religious organizations’ leaders decided to address their churches’ financial
difficulties through secular law.

A. Recognizing the Legality of Financial Problems
The term “ostrich defense” is most commonly associated with how
individuals tend to approach their increasingly precarious finances.146 Though
people may understand the severity of their economic circumstances, they
refuse to deal with their situations because they believe better financial times
lay ahead or because they simply do not want to admit failure.147 “Ostrich
effect” was how one attorney labeled religious organization leaders’ approach
to financial problems.148

documents. For instance, the interviewed attorneys handled similar average numbers of
cases during the study timeframe as other attorneys.
146 See Mann & Porter, supra note 3, at 313.
147 See generally supra Part II.D.
148 Telephone Interview with S. Tex. Att’y Two, supra note 129, at 6.
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Attorneys universally commented that the institutions they represented
typically waited long past when it would have been more effective to seek
assistance, usually not coming to them until the “drop dead date” before a
foreclosure sale.149 Most prevalently, attorneys attributed the delay to leaders’
desire to believe that their churches’ situations would miraculously improve
despite declining contributions and other serious issues. Pastors seemed
unrealistic about what they could do, sometimes “going by faith”150 and
“thinking [that] a miracle is going to fall out of the sky.”151 They were ill
prepared for “the inevitability of a filing,” again perhaps because they had
“faith that things will work out.”152
A primary source of the churches’ downfalls was financing of the
purchase or construction of buildings with the idea that the congregations were
going to improve and grow, a “build it and they will come” “field of dreams”
mentality.153 Members became emotionally attached to particular properties
because “they [were] looking for a home,”154 and leaders opted to “wait for
divine intervention.”155 Another attorney summed up the problem as “an
inability to really, really grasp the gravity of the situation.”156
Discussions with leaders confirmed attorneys’ impressions that leaders
tended to postpone thinking about their churches’ problems as requiring any
action, particularly legal action. For instance, one leader admitted that at first
he primarily spent time “pray[ing] about [the situation], and I said Lord, what
am I going to do?”157 Even if leaders knew of or understood the benefits and
149 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Six 3 (May 10, 2013); see also

Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Two 4 (Apr. 18, 2013) (noting that the
represented religious organization was “ahead of the curve” in seeking assistance three
months before filing); Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Att’y Two 2 (May 21, 2013) (“I
don’t ever get a lot of time [to prepare the bankruptcy filing].”); Telephone Interview with
W. Tenn. Att’y Three, supra note 139, at 3 (noting that filing on an emergency basis is
typical of church cases).
150 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Att’y One 2 (May 2, 2013).
151 Telephone Interview with Md. Att’y Three 4 (May 24, 2013).
152 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y One 4 (Apr. 24, 2013).
153 Telephone Interview with S. Tex. Att’y Two, supra note 129, at 5; see also
Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Att’y One, supra note 150, at 4 (“[The churches]
just didn’t have the money to handle [mortgage payments], but they thought things were
going to get better.”); Telephone Interview with S. Fla. Att’y Two 2 (Apr. 23, 2013)
(“They were building [the] Taj Mahal, and then the economy went where it went in
2005.”).
154 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Three, supra note 138, at 6; see also
Telephone Interview with N. Tex. Att’y Three 2 (May 13, 2013) (noting leaders tended to
“fall[] in love with one church facility”).
155 Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Att’y Four 6 (May 14, 2013); see also Foohey,
When Churches Reorganize, supra note 1, at 293 (discussing why congregations may
become emotionally attached to their buildings).
156 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Att’y One 3 (May 2, 2013).
157 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three 2 (May 14, 2013); see also
Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three 2–3 (July 17, 2013) (describing how the
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costs of bankruptcy, they initially rejected considering filing as an option—
that is, they did not view the churches’ financial problems as legal
problems.158 Rather, when discussing the prebankruptcy situations, they
described trying to deal with creditors themselves,159 seeking grants,160 or
holding fundraisers.161
One pastor linked leaders’ unwillingness to address their churches’
financial situations with bankruptcy with overconfidence and “egos.”162
Another noted that “the psychological impact [of financial distress] on the
pastor and the [pastor’s] family and the church is really tough.”163 Leaders’
descriptions of the situations revealed disbelief that their churches had landed
in such desperate financial conditions.164 They felt that they were “caught off
guard”165 and unprepared to handle their churches’ finances apart from the
usual avenues of approaching their creditors and other involved parties
themselves.166

congregation waited months in hopes of getting a grant even though it increasingly was
evident that the party promising the grant could not deliver and the church would be
broke).
158 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two 2 (May 3, 2013) (detailing
how an attorney on the board initially suggested bankruptcy, but the idea was rejected
without discussion because “there was too much of a stigma with that”); Telephone
Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 5 (“I wasn’t even familiar with a
chapter 11.”).
159 See Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two 2 (May 10, 2013) (“[W]e
went to the bank several times and tried to get a modification or work some terms out.”);
Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 1–2 (detailing how
the leadership was unsuccessful in renegotiating the mortgage loan); Telephone Interview
with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 2–3 (noting that the leadership thought their
mortgage creditor would modify their loan); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader
Two, supra note 135, at 4 (stating that the church tried to negotiate with the mortgage
lender, among other nonlegal actions).
160 See Telephone Interview with S. Fla. Att’y Three 4 (Apr. 26, 2013) (noting that the
religious organization debtor had received a grant prior to filing under chapter 11);
Telephone Interview with E. N.C. Att’y One 2 (May 3, 2012) (describing how one client
tried to obtain grant money to build an assisted living facility to supplement the
organization’s income).
161 See Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 4 (“We
had some fundraising drives to try to [avoid having to approach the mortgage lender].”).
162 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader One 4 (Apr. 17, 2013).
163 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 4.
164 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 2 (“[It]
seem[ed] like things beg[an] to spin out of control.”); Telephone Interview with N. Ill.
Leader One, supra note 135, at 2–3 (mentioning repeatedly the church’s good credit
rating).
165 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 6.
166 See also Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 4
(lamenting that the church “had opportunities where we could have avoided
[bankruptcy]”).
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Leaders also experienced their churches’ downfalls as personal failings.
They spoke of how they felt responsible and inadequate,167 how they believed
that “[the pastor] go[es] down with the ship,”168 and how they put off, but then
ultimately decided to file for bankruptcy because of not wanting “to
psychologically feel like I was a loser.”169 Thereby, leaders’ perceptions of
how they were expected to respond to their churches’ problems and of how
best to maintain their organizations’ “public images” also seemed to steer
them away from initially considering their churches’ financial situations as
addressable through legal means.
Some leaders’ inability to recognize that their organizations’ precarious
financial situations were legal problems further stemmed from a lack of
information. A couple pastors came from business backgrounds or sat on
trustee boards with members who had business or legal expertise.170 But most
leaders were unaware of the basics of bankruptcy as it related to smaller
businesses, describing bankruptcy as “a big black box.”171
Ultimately, the churches’ creditors pushed leaders to view the financial
problems as legal problems by taking concrete action, usually in the form of
initiating foreclosure proceedings.172 Occasionally, a board member or
congregant also brought the availability of a legal remedy to the attention of
the senior pastor and other leadership.173 In this way, creditors served as the
primary “agents of transformation,” shaping the leaders’ construction of
financial problems as legal rather than as private problems or simply
167 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5–6.
168 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 4.
169 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 4.
170 See Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 4

(“[W]e’ve all known about, at least at that time, what the purpose of bankruptcy was for.”);
Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 2 (noting that a
board member was a lawyer).
171 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 8; see also
Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 3 (noting that when they
sought legal advice, they learned about the consequences of partial payments and that the
automatic stay could halt foreclosure); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader One 3–4
(May 1, 2013) (noting that the leadership mainly relied on information obtained from the
government); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 5 (“I
wasn’t even familiar with a chapter 11.”).
172 Six of the leaders specifically linked seeking out information about bankruptcy with
lenders’ actions. Three leaders preemptively sought advice about legal options when they
realized that their churches would not be able to meet their obligations going forward.
173 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 2 (noting
that a board member who was a lawyer suggested chapter 11 when the church began
having problems); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 5
(explaining that a friend who was an attorney “encouraged” the leader to think about
bankruptcy); see also Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One 3–4 (Apr. 17, 2013)
(discussing how the church was facing litigation related to personal injury and explaining
that the general counsel suggested bankruptcy in regards to that claim and issues with
making mortgage payments).
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(hopefully temporary) bad luck.174 Interestingly, three leaders told me that
their mortgage lenders suggested exploring bankruptcy after negotiations
halted.175 Eventually, often facing creditors’ impending actions, leaders
admitted to themselves that their churches’ situations would not improve
without help from third parties, that they “needed someone else.”176

B. Cementing the Legal Problem and Learning About Bankruptcy
Leaders called upon a carefully chosen network of people in seeking
information about their legal options. They tended to search for advice quietly,
selectively approaching other pastors of similar congregations, church
members, friends, and trusted professional contacts.177 Leaders’ selectivity
related to not wanting others, sometimes including their own members, to
know of their churches’ financial plight.178 For example, one pastor worried
that members might “lose faith” and “draw back the funds” or that outsiders
might be “scandalized and tell lies.”179 Another leader only spoke to a few
other ministers, “but not too many” because “in this town, people talk, and [I]
only asked a few choice people.”180 An attorney likewise noted that church
debtors often seemed inclined “to try to keep [their financial situation and
chapter 11 filing] as quiet as possible.”181
174 See Albiston & Sandefur, supra note 14, at 118; Felstiner et al., supra note 5, at

639.

175 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 2; Telephone
Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 3; Telephone Interview with
W. Tenn. Leader One, supra note 171, at 3. Attorneys hypothesized that mortgage lenders’
hands were tied by federal programs that required banks to exhaust their remedies, or that
they reached a point where they had to take action even if they ultimately did not want to
foreclose on a church, leading them to suggest bankruptcy. See Foohey, When Churches
Reorganize, supra note 1, at 294–95.
176 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 4.
177 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 2
(mentioning that a board member was an attorney who suggested that the leadership think
about bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at
3 (explaining how the leader told his wife, mother, and “other pastor friends of mine” about
the bank’s suggestion of filing for bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader
Two, supra note 135, at 5 (noting that “my friend who was once an attorney himself, he
kinda encouraged me” to think about legal options); see also infra note 182 and
accompanying text.
178 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 2 (noting
that the membership did not know about the filing and explaining that the leader discussed
the church’s situation with a couple pastors); Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader
Three, supra note 157, at 3 (explaining that the leader did not tell congregants about the
filing).
179 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 4–5.
180 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader One, supra note 171, at 3, 5.
181 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Att’y Two 2 (May 1, 2013) (noting that middle
class congregations in particular were apt to keep their financial plights quiet); see also
Telephone Interview with Md. Att’y Three, supra note 151, at 3 (noting that in the future,
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Most prevalently, leaders approached pastors of other similar
congregations, including those congregations that previously had filed under
chapter 11.182 These other pastors discussed bankruptcy from their viewpoints
and level of sophistication, which seemed to reinforce in the leaders’ minds
that financial problems were legal problems.183 Other leaders knew personally
or through word of mouth of other churches going through foreclosure or
filing for bankruptcy, which they appeared to weigh in their calculation of
whether to seek to reorganize.184 One pastor similarly later “encouraged a
couple other churches” to consider bankruptcy.185
Discussions with their trusted contacts encouraged leaders to look for
attorneys to learn more about the intricacies of bankruptcy so that they could
evaluate chapter 11 as an option. Leaders sequentially described consulting
with others and then approaching bankruptcy counsel, perhaps evidencing that
leaders first confirmed that their problems were legal before gathering
information to assess bankruptcy in particular.186 To find counsel, leaders
seemed to rely on their social networks, including sometimes involving their
members in the search for potential counsel.187 They also consulted with
attorneys that they had retained for prior matters.188

the attorney will require a meeting with the church’s members because “[i]t gets kind of
foggy because the pastor might be directing you to go in one direction, and you’re not sure
if this is the direction that the congregation wants to go in”).
182 Five of the ten leaders described seeking out and talking with other pastors.
183 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at
3–4 (talking with other pastors then seeking out bankruptcy counsel); Telephone Interview
with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 5 (same). Pastors also referred leaders to
knowledgeable members of their own congregations. See Telephone Interview with Cent.
Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 3.
184 See Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 4 (noting
that “I had two or three churches that I knew the pastor personally” that had filed for
bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 2
(“[W]e actually had seen some churches go belly up and go into foreclosure.”); Telephone
Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 4 (“If you go down to the U.S.
district court, you see quite a bit of churches.”).
185 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 4.
186 See supra note 183.
187 See Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5
(involving membership in the search for bankruptcy counsel); Telephone Interview with
Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 2 (same); Telephone Interview with N. Ill.
Leader One, supra note 135, at 5 (noting that the church sought advice from other
ministers regarding law firms).
188 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 5
(explaining that a real estate attorney provided the referral); Telephone Interview with
Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 3 (same); Telephone Interview with N. Ga.
Leader One, supra note 173, at 3 (explaining that the general counsel referred the church to
a bankruptcy attorney).
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Attorneys likewise hypothesized that networks among religious
organizations led them both to the decision to file and to attorneys.189
Attorneys identified other professionals, usually attorneys, financial
consultants, or real estate professionals, as the predominant source of their
referrals.190 Few of the attorneys advertised beyond websites and very limited
social media.191 A handful of attorneys noted personal connections to their
communities or specifically advertising to religious organizations.192
The frequency of leaders’ and attorneys’ comments about these networks
supports the hypothesis that the effects of social spillover and social capital
may have partially caused the clustering of religious organizations’ filings
during the study timeframe. Studies show that households considering how to
handle their financial problems, and organization’s managers and directors
deciding whether to implement new practices, rely on two modes of learning
that a problem is legal: direct contact with social networks and indirect
observations of their communities.193 Likewise, the interviewed leaders
directly talked with contacts and indirectly looked to the behavior of similar
congregations in thinking about how to manage their churches’ financial
problems once they realized that their internal efforts were failing.
At the most basic level, the interviews reveal that these networks provided
religious organizations’ leaders with needed basic information about
bankruptcy. Attorneys provided leaders with crucial information and guidance
about chapter 11 in particular.194 Even if the leaders had some knowledge of
bankruptcy, like most nonattorneys, they were mistaken about certain of the
important details.195 Collectively, leaders’ discussions with those in their
189 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Six, supra note 149, at 2
(noting that the second church found the attorney through the first church); Telephone
Interview with W. Tenn. Att’y Two, supra note 181, at 2 (“[S]everal of them came through
other ministers who I’ve represented.”); Telephone Interview with N. Tex. Att’y Two 2
(May 2, 2013) (“[F]rom other discussions with them, I would assume, it’s a small
community.”).
190 Twenty-one attorneys specifically mentioned such referrals as the predominant way
they came into contact with future clients.
191 Seven attorneys said they advertised beyond their websites and social media. Two
used search engine marketing. Three directed advertisements to consumers.
192 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Att’y One, supra note 150, at 1 (noting
being involved in the church community); Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Att’y One 1
(May 10, 2013) (noting preparing seminars for community organizations); Telephone
Interview with N. Ill. Att’y Four, supra note 155, at 1–2 (detailing giving seminars to
churches, sending mailings to churches, and advertising on Christian radio stations).
193 See supra Part II.B–C.
194 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 5 (noting
that the attorney explained each step in the process and each document); Telephone
Interview with W. Tenn. Leader One, supra note 171, at 3 (“[W]e were dependent on our
attorney.”).
195 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 6
(describing being surprised at the level of scrutiny of both the church and leadership even
though also noting that the leadership knew about bankruptcy generally); Telephone
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social networks and with attorneys cemented their views of their
congregations’ financial problems as legal and as best addressable with filing
under chapter 11.

C. Considering Bankruptcy’s Stigma
Even if religious organizations’ leaders understood that financially
declaring bankruptcy represented the most viable remaining option, they still
needed to decide that trying to reorganize was a socially and morally
acceptable path for their congregation. Beyond discussing the usefulness of
reorganization and referring leaders to attorneys, those in leaders’ social
networks most importantly shared their opinions about the propriety of filing
under chapter 11—both as to what filing for bankruptcy meant for their
churches’ images and the leaders’ own feelings of self-worth. Most of the
interviewed leaders emphatically explained that prior to filing under chapter
11, they had believed that filing for bankruptcy implied a failing, both for their
churches and themselves, and thus was not an option.
One leader specifically told me that I should put in my writings that
“bankruptcy from a spiritual standpoint is a no-no.”196 Another leader
similarly stated, “I’ve said it openly that I don’t think bankruptcy is a choice
for the Christian.”197 That same leader also discussed thinking about the
church’s financial plight as though it was a personal plight: “If you went into
bankruptcy, you got out of paying your debt, and I don’t think that’s
right. . . . [M]y belief system . . . is if a man don’t work, he don’t eat. And I
went out and got all of this debt [on behalf of the church], [and] I should pay
for it.”198
Others echoed this sentiment, stating that they believed bankruptcy was
“the end of the world . . . the end of your worthiness.”199 Leaders said that
they feared filing would bring a “big negative stigma”200 and would result in
outsiders being “scandalized” and gossiping.201 They likewise felt anxious that
Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5 (expressing surprise at how
quickly the court approved the agreement between church and its lender); Telephone
Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 5 (“I only knew about two
bankruptcies—chapter 13 and the other one.”).
Attorneys likewise commented that their religious organization clients would have
benefitted from being more aware of bankruptcy as an option. See, e.g., Telephone
Interview with N. Ill. Att’y Four, supra note 155, at 6 (“[Chapter 11]’s just something that
[religious organizations] need to be aware of.”); Telephone Interview with Md. Att’y
Three, supra note 151, at 6 (“[I]f people had more knowledge of the process or what their
options would be before their emergency, I think that’s really helpful.”).
196 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 4.
197 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 3.
198 Id. at 6.
199 Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 5.
200 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 5.
201 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 5.
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filing would affect their membership because “internally, and to the church
psyche, [bankruptcy]’s not good.”202 Similar to how individuals react to their
financial problems, perceptions of bankruptcy’s stigma and shame seemed to
influence how leaders thought about their churches’ debts and their decisions
to use bankruptcy.203
Leaders’ statements further signal that worries about stigma and shame,
while not mutually exclusive, operated distinctly in how leaders perceived
bankruptcy. Stigma and shame are separate, though associated concepts.
Stigma refers to societal disapproval of the actions, characteristics, or traits of
an individual or group that deviate from others’ norms or expectations.204 In
contrast to the “public” nature of stigma,205 shame focuses on internal
“private” beliefs about personal failings.206 Inability to live up to one’s own
standards or the perceived standards of others may prompt feelings of shame,
thereby linking shame and stigma.207 In the context of consumer bankruptcy,
the effects of stigma and shame are often combined.208
Three leaders’ discussions of their decisions to file evidenced both stigma
and shame. Bankruptcy was socially and spiritually wrong, and also a personal
failing.209 Four other leaders focused predominately on bankruptcy’s stigma,
talking almost exclusively about how others would perceive the churches’
filings. Conversely, one leader repeatedly mentioned feeling “personally
responsible” for not being able to see the church through its financial issues,
thereby expressing shame, but not necessarily stigmatization associated with
the bankruptcy filing.210
Indeed, that leader couched the ultimate decision to file in terms of a
business decision. Inability to repay the church’s debts despite best efforts
meant “feeling bad . . . almost feel[ing] like you’re a failure,” but the act of
202 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 9.
203 See supra Part II.D.
204 The modern sociological study of stigma originates from ERVING GOFFMAN,

STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963). See also GERHARD
FALK, STIGMA: HOW WE TREAT OUTSIDERS 17 (2001); Sousa, supra note 61, at 436.
205 Michael Lewis, Shame and Stigma, in SHAME: INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR,
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, AND CULTURE 126, 127 (Paul Gilbert & Bernice Andrews eds., 1998)
(“Stigma, for the most part, constitutes a public violation or action. For a person to fear
stigma from . . . a violation, it must be transparent . . . .”).
206 Id. at 126–27 (“Shame is best understood as an intense negative emotion having to
do with the self in relation to standards, responsibility, and such attribut[es] as global selffailure. . . . Shame can take place privately as long as the attributions that give rise to it
occur.”).
207 Hayes, supra note 80, at 33 (“How people label a person constitutes a key
component in eliciting his or her shame.”); Lewis, supra note 205, at 127 (“The literature
on stigma and its relation [to] shame support[] the idea of stigma as a cause of shame.”).
208 See Sousa, supra note 61, at 442–45 (discussing how the general concept of stigma
applies to individuals and households filing for bankruptcy).
209 In particular, see supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
210 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5.
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filing itself was not worrisome: “people do this all the time, leaders do [this]
all the time, anything to keep going, corporations do it all the time.”211
Similarly, for the other two leaders, bankruptcy first and foremost was a
business choice. When asked if they struggled with the decision to file, one
replied that “there was no struggle . . . because we had [run] out of options as
to which way to go forward,” and referenced “what’s in the best interests of
the church.”212 The other pastor simply said that the church needed to
reorganize because its mortgage lender was not interested in renegotiating the
loan that had a balloon payment due shortly.213
A minority of leaders did not express feeling stigmatized or shameful
about their churches’ filings. Importantly, however, these leaders did not make
the decision to file hastily or without trying to work with their creditors
first.214 But, they did not view their ultimate use of bankruptcy as socially or
morally wrong. For example, one pastor tried to negotiate and held
fundraisers, but once bankruptcy was the church’s only remaining option, the
decision to file “all boiled down to my commitment. And I didn’t want to
psychological[ly] feel like I was a loser. I wasn’t going to go down without
giving them a fight.”215 The variety and nuances of leaders’ discussions of the
propriety of filing for bankruptcy suggests that the differences between and the
roots of the stigma and shame associated with indebtedness and bankruptcy is
worthy of more detailed study, as discussed in Part V.
For those leaders who viewed filing for bankruptcy as socially and morally
unacceptable, discussions with others augmented, though did not seem to
substantially change the leaders’ opinions. They still thought of bankruptcy as
taboo. Bankruptcy was “almost like that red button that you push, you push it
only if that’s all that you have to do to do what you need to do.”216 But leaders
added that they had come to understand that bankruptcy could be a tool to
regain control of their businesses, and that they ultimately were confident that

211 Id.
212 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 3.
213 Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 2. These leaders’

statements mirror the results of some of Sousa’s recent interviews with consumer debtors.
Those debtors in Sousa’s study who did not express feelings of stigma or shame stated that
filing was defensive, commonplace, or a business decision. Sousa, supra note 61, at 469–
73.
214 See Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 2 (stating
that the church tried to work with the mortgage lender, and that the lender suggested
bankruptcy); Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 2 (noting
that the church’s mortgage lender would not agree to a modification).
215 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 4.
216 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 9; see also
Telephone Interview with M. Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5 (“But I don’t [look at]
bankruptcy as a tool to run to because it’s there—you mismanage what you had, and now
I’ll run to bankruptcy.”).
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their churches had to use bankruptcy.217 Regardless, chapter 11 was the only
option: “It was either file or lose what you had.”218
Interviews with attorneys provided secondary evidence of the effect of
perceptions about the unseemliness of bankruptcy on churches’ filings.
Attorneys discussed how they believed that “[m]ost people are very
embarrassed about [filing] and it’s a decision that’s not taken lightly.”219 A
few recalled speaking with congregants about chapter 11 to allay fears because
“bankruptcy is a scary word for a lot of people.”220 One attorney mentioned
discussing the “sin” of bankruptcy with religious organizations’ leaders
because sometimes they “say it’s immoral to file bankruptcy.”221
In the end, though the religious institutions’ leaders benefitted from
speaking with others about bankruptcy, the stigma and shame associated with
bankruptcy remained. In line with hypotheses about social spillovers and
capital, this result suggests that information sharing through social networks
may operate to clarify the process more than to shift attitudes about
bankruptcy.222 Part V also explores this insight and its consequences for
bankruptcy policy.

D. Rationalizing the Decision to File
Interviews with leaders were most enlightening in how they talked about
their churches’ chapter 11 cases. Those leaders who continued to view
bankruptcy as socially and morally wrong, despite understanding that chapter
11 was the best option to address their organizations’ financial situations, had
to harmonize their decisions to file with these beliefs. Likewise, even those
leaders who did not condemn bankruptcy as unchristian or who claimed that
they did not feel stigmatized or experience shame for using chapter 11 had
217 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 5
(explaining that pastors “have been educated to say that [bankruptcy] is not a bad thing”);
Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5 (noting a change
in perception about the breadth of the immorality of bankruptcy).
218 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader One, supra note 162, at 4; see also
Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 2 (explaining that
when the church was over a year behind on mortgage payments, “then the consensus was
that there wasn’t much of an option, so we had to”); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn.
Leader One, supra note 171, at 3 (“[I]t was something that we needed to do because our
financial situation was getting worse.”).
219 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Three, supra note 138, at 6.
220 Telephone Interview with E. N.C. Att’y One, supra note 160, at 2; see also
Telephone Interview with Md. Att’y Two 2 (May 7, 2013) (describing a special meeting
where the attorney “presented the strategy to the church and answered a series of questions
from members of the congregation so that the [members] were comfortable with . . . the
strategy”); Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Att’y One, supra note 156, at 2 (describing
making reports to the membership to keep them abreast of the process and answering
questions).
221 Telephone Interview with N. Tex. Att’y One 4 (May 1, 2013).
222 See supra Part II.C.
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reasons for their churches’ filings apart from simple economic analyses.
Consistent with literature discussing how consumer debtors overcome
cognitive dissonance to rationalize filing for bankruptcy, leaders cited
justifications for their decisions to file, tried to shift blame to their creditors,
and discussed how they were going to “transcend” the filings by changing
their financial habits going forward.223
Leaders most often justified their churches’ filings by discussing how they
did not want to lose buildings that their members had built themselves or to
which their congregants had emotional ties.224 Consumer debtors similarly
have described their bankruptcies as “of necessity”225 and in “self-defense.”226
Consumer debtors also have justified their bankruptcy filings by clarifying that
their debts arose from medical issues or layoffs.227
Likewise, in explaining the importance of buildings, some leaders
specified that their mortgage lender was their only creditor, clarifying that
their filings were “totally about the mortgage.”228 One leader went so far as to
state: “If I had some other creditors, I don’t think I would have [filed] because
of my conscience.”229 Another leader talked of the church’s creditworthiness
and pleaded that “all we ever sought to do was pay our bills to the best of our
ability.”230 Leaders also justified the filings by noting that their organizations
were community-outreach driven and describing how the churches provided
services to underserved populations.231
Though leaders often took responsibility for their churches’ situations,
many simultaneously tried to disengage themselves from their actions by
characterizing their churches as “innocent”232 and laying blame for the
situations elsewhere.233 Leaders primarily blamed creditors for dealing with
their churches when they thought creditors should have recognized that they
were not able to pay or, more malevolently, for taking advantage of them, for
being predatory and “totally heartless.”234 One leader mentioned that before
223 See supra Part II.D.
224 Seven of the ten leaders specifically mentioned not wanting to lose buildings that

meant more to their congregations than simply an economic investment. One other leader
talked about land the church had purchased in hopes of building a new campus.
225 Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 88.
226 Sousa, supra note 61, at 470–71.
227 Id. at 479–81; Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 88–89.
228 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Two, supra note 158, at 3.
229 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 3.
230 Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 3, 6.
231 See id. at 8; Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 3.
232 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 9–10.
233 See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text.
234 Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 3; see also
Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader One, supra note 162, at 5 (“I fault the
[church’s] administration as well as the creditors.”); Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal.
Leader Three, supra note 157, at 10 (“I’m not blaming [the mortgage lender] for
everything . . . but . . . they were predatory.”).
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encountering a predatory lender, the church had resources sufficient to meet its
obligations, and thus believed that using bankruptcy was not “a sin issue like
we did anything.”235 Consumer debtors similarly have implicated their lenders
and unforeseen circumstances as the true culprits of their bankruptcy filings,236
while defending their filings based on the stress their debts had put on
themselves and their families.237
Leaders also implicated their members, though not nearly as forcefully.
Rather, they lamented that giving to the church was one of the first items that
members cut from their budgets,238 and that their jobs had increasingly
become about convincing their members to tithe.239 They also thought that
members lost faith in the church’s mission when it struggled with funding,240
and that people expect church to be a place to go to escape financial troubles,
not to have to deal with more of them.241 Some cited the economic downturn,
observing that they were but one of many churches affected.242 Consumer
debtors too have referenced the fact that bankruptcy is “commonplace” as a
justification for their filings.243
Again similar to consumer debtor’s declarations that they would teach
others about financial management,244 leaders further spoke of implementing
educational programs to teach their members about living debt free.245 They
also planned to counsel other pastors in considering taking on debt.246 Leaders
made these declarations and mentioned these programs ostensibly in attempt to
absolve their churches and themselves from bankruptcy’s stigma and their
shame.247
Relatedly, some leaders declared that they would never file again,248
which also is consistent with consumer debtors’ avowals never to file again.249
In connection with these declarations, leaders reiterated that they were
opposed to debt and operating beyond their churches’ economic means.250
When asked if they would file again if they could go back and be given a “do
235 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 6.
236 Sousa, supra note 61, at 470–72, 475–77.
237 Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 90–92.
238 Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 2.
239 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader One, supra note 162, at 5.
240 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 4.
241 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 1.
242 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 4;

Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 6.
243 Sousa, supra note 61, at 472–73, 477–79.
244 Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 92–93; see supra note 96.
245 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 9.
246 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 5.
247 In total, five leaders’ discussions evidenced trying to transcend the filings.
248 Four leaders said their churches would not file again.
249 Thorne & Anderson, supra note 80, at 89–90.
250 See Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 9;
Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 6.
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over,” four leaders said they would not.251 This answer came even after these
leaders told me that they considered their churches’ chapter 11 cases to have
been successful. When pushed on this seeming contradiction, they reiterated
bankruptcy’s stigma and talked of its toll on their members apart from the
perceived stigma.
A method of “deviance avowal” that appears more unique to religious
organization leaders is the use of specific words to describe chapter 11.252
These words signaled attempts to distance their decisions from the negative
connotation that they continued to associate with the word “bankruptcy.”
When responding to questions about their “bankruptcy” cases,253 they used
different terminology, referring to the filings as allowing their organizations
“to restructure, reorganize,”254 “to restructure, to revamp,”255 and to “get back
on track, get [back to] business as usual, straighten our mortgage out, and go
forward.”256 They conceptualized their filings as “a temporary move,”257 a
“bridge gap,”258 and a “transitional period”259 necessary to “work out some
kind of plan.”260 Using this terminology also may have helped leaders reduce
cognitive dissonance by updating their memories about how they decided that
prebankruptcy filing under chapter 11 was warranted.261
Interviews with attorneys further support the conclusion that leaders used
these rationalization techniques. Some of the ways in which the attorneys
described interacting with religious organizations’ leaders evidence that the
attorneys were cognizant of the leaders’ need to justify their filings. One
attorney spoke of requesting that a church create a committee to oversee the
chapter 11 case, and strategically naming the committee “the reorganization
committee.”262 Another attorney recommended to religious organization
debtors that they put together press releases describing their bankruptcies as
“reorganizations.”263 Fifteen other attorneys used the terms “reorganization”
251 Two leaders said they would file if they were able to make the decision again. One
leader answered yes and then no. Two leaders skirted the question. Another leader had
taken over for the pastor in charge right before the filing and declared that the church
would not have been in the situation under current leadership.
252 Consumer debtors similarly might refer to their chapter 13 cases as “debt payment
plans” rather than using the word “bankruptcy.”
253 When crafting the interview scripts, I purposefully referred to cases filed under the
Bankruptcy Code with the terms “chapter 11” or “bankruptcy.”
254 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 4.
255 Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 5.
256 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 4.
257 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157, at 5.
258 Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 5.
259 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 5.
260 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 9. In total, six
of the leaders used such terminology.
261 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
262 Telephone Interview with S. Tex. Att’y Two, supra note 129, at 8.
263 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Att’y Two, supra note 181, at 2.
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or “restructure” in discussing their small business and religious institution
clients. This phraseology sometimes contrasted with the language they used to
describe consumer bankruptcy,264 perhaps indicating that attorneys
conceptualized these cases as a distinct subset of bankruptcy, or that they had
become accustomed to presenting chapter 11 in this light.265
Another attorney counseled religious organizations that they could repay
their creditors back in full later.266 Consumer debtor attorneys have stated that
they use the same tactic in helping their clients overcome emotional reticence
to filing.267 Attorneys also encouraged their religious organization clients to
think of the church as a business—that is, to bring a more secular view of the
institutions to bear on their situations.268

E. From Religion to Business
Attorneys’ observations that religious organization leaders would benefit
from treating their churches more as businesses reflects the result of leaders’
journeys from their churches’ financial distress through law and to bankruptcy.
An important part of the process was appreciating that their churches are
businesses, and that like other business leaders, they should consider using
potentially beneficial legal solutions. Religious organization leaders’
discussions of their chapter 11 cases reflect this insight.
One leader clarified that though “churches operate with good intentions,”
they do not have “enough business people on hand” to plan adequately.269
Another contrasted religious organizations with for-profit businesses,
264 See, e.g., N. Ga. Att’y Two, supra note 149, at 1 (distinguishing between
bankruptcy and reorganization in describing practice); S. Tex. Att’y One 1 (May 2, 2013)
(describing the law practice as encompassing “small business reorganization[]” and
“consumer bankruptc[y]”).
265 Of course, chapter 11 is titled “reorganization,” which is another, perhaps simpler
reason why attorneys sometimes referred to these cases as reorganizations or
restructurings.
266 Telephone Interview with N. Tex. Att’y One, supra note 221, at 5 (describing to
clients that “life is a long-term proposition”).
267 Attorneys have described counseling clients that they can repay creditors
voluntarily post-discharge and citing their clients’ responsibility to their children and the
immorality of creditors in an attempt to allay their clients’ concerns about filing for
bankruptcy. Braucher, supra note 80, at 541–42.
268 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Att’y Three, supra note 138, at 5–6
(describing how leadership conducts business on a handshake and how it is “hard for them
to accept that somebody would try to cheat them or beat them in this kind of situation,
especially with the church”); Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Att’y Two, supra note 149,
at 5 (noting that chapter 11 allowed churches to think of themselves as businesses);
Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Att’y One 2 (Apr. 24, 2013) (“The churches don’t like to
think of themselves as [a] business, but . . . you have a relatively simple [business]
model.”); Telephone Interview with N. Ill. Att’y Four, supra note 155, at 6 (“[C]hurch
officials often times don’t explore the more secular solutions to their problem.”).
269 Telephone Interview with Middle Fla. Leader One, supra note 135, at 6.
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explaining that churches tend to have “emotional ties,” while “people out in
the world[,] they do business just like they do business.”270 The leader
believed that “looking at chapter 11” helped the church’s leadership
understand “that sometimes people out in the secular field have . . . got it
going on more wisely than people that deal with spiritual matters.”271
Similarly, another leader commented that the most significant lesson of the
filing was that record keeping is “extremely important” and that “it’s not as
hard as I thought it was.”272
Consistent with these statements, leaders’ progressions in their thinking
about their churches’ financial distress was marked by an increasing awareness
that by engaging with financial institutions, even those that catered to religious
organizations,273 they had at least put a foot in the secular world. Their
creditors most often provided the first push towards legalizing their financial
problems. Discussions with other pastors convinced them that they could not
extract their churches from souring relationships with creditors and worsening
financial situations without the help of nonreligious professionals. And
discussions with attorneys solidified their understandings of what chapter 11
entailed, how reorganization could help them achieve their churches’ goals,
and ultimately how using bankruptcy law was the best course of action—that
is, how those in the “secular field” were wise to use reorganization as a tool.
Naturally, leaders experienced this process through a religious gloss. At
the same time as they understood that their lenders had to deal with them as
business partners, they held their organizations apart from businesses. They
raved about their churches’ good deeds in the community and their personal
sacrifices, stating that “[n]obody wins whenever the churches have to
suffer . . . but ultimately because the churches are in the businesses of doing
ministry, [they] will always survive and be stronger.”274 However, the leaders
eventually saw their churches’ financial situations as legal problems and
decided that chapter 11 was the best option to help them preserve the buildings
and communities that their members held dear.

270 Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Two, supra note 159, at 8.
271 Id. at 5, 8 (connecting this insight to the Year of Jubilee).
272 Telephone Interview with W. Tenn. Leader Two, supra note 135, at 7–8.
273 For instance, one church received its loan from Evangelical Christian Credit Union,

a financial institution that primarily does business with Christian churches. See Telephone
Interview with N. Ill. Leader One, supra note 135, at 2; see also Telephone Interview with
E. N.C. Att’y Two 3 (May 14, 2013) (describing how Foundation Capital worked with
pastors); Telephone Interview with S. Tex. Att’y One, supra note 264, at 6 (noting that
Foundation Capital deals with religious institutions).
274 Telephone Interview with N. Ga. Leader One, supra note 173, at 4.
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V. THE “DEMAND SIDE” OF LAW AND BANKRUPTCY’S STIGMA
A. Shedding Light on the Legal System
In sketching how religious organizations interact with and invoke law to
address financial problems, these interviews expand our knowledge about
what tips people, including business leaders, toward choosing law over doing
nothing or effectively engaging in self-help when faced with legal problems.
People and businesses experience a multitude of problems every day, many of
which are addressable by law. The legal system they could turn to is equally
vast. Nonetheless, scholarly inquiries into the public experience with law
primarily have concentrated on how lower and middle income individuals
interact with the legal system to explore issues of access to justice and the
mobilization of law.275
The results of this study show that leaders approached their religious
organizations’ financial problems in ways that reflect the process by which
people understand their options for dealing with their legal problems.276
Leaders initially relied on their experiences, drawing upon how they perceived
churches and their roles as church leaders in considering how to respond to
their organizations’ financial declines.277 Once creditors pushed them to
reconsider their view of the churches’ situations, the leaders turned to their
social networks and looked to the actions of other congregations in thinking
through their problems.278 And similar to how lower and moderate income
individuals discuss their justiciable problems, the leaders rarely mentioned
concerns about the cost of filing under chapter 11 as a dominant factor in their
decision to file.279
But religious organization leaders, in effect, run businesses. They should
have the knowledge, education, experience, and access to resources that come
with leadership. Several mentioned generally being aware of the legal options
to deal with financial problems, including bankruptcy, or that they or a few of
their churches’ members had some business background.280 Yet, the leaders
still initially did not think of their churches’ problems as legal and still reached

275 This not to say that scholars have not explored how people and businesses react to

their civil justice problems in other contexts, only that the predominant (and recent) focus
has been on lower and middle income individuals. See supra Part II.A.
276 See supra Parts II.A, C.
277 See supra Part IV.A.
278 See supra Part IV.B.
279 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. For instance, one leader mentioned that
the cost of chapter 11 for a business was much greater than the cost of a chapter 13 case,
which caught the church off guard, though ultimately did not influence the decision to file
or postpone the filing. Telephone Interview with Cent. Cal. Leader Three, supra note 157,
at 5.
280 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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out to their social networks to confirm the availability of legal options to
address their organizations’ problems.
Moreover, the religious organization leaders’ journeys from financial
distress to bankruptcy indicate that the leaders integrated their conceptions of
themselves and their actions into their churches’ situations. Leaders spoke of
what their churches’ financial problems and filings under chapter 11 meant for
their own feelings of self-worth.281 Research has linked similar theories of
relying on knowledge, social cues, and social network with how managers and
directors of businesses consider whether to adopt legal and other
innovations.282 Leaders of other organizations, including nonprofits and
smaller businesses, may have a similar tendency to tie the personal with the
organization—a potential dynamic worthy of further exploration.
When considering future research, it also is crucial to assess the dynamics
of how people’s understandings about the legality of their problems unfold.
For instance, given that religious organization leaders’ journeys to chapter 11
often begin with not conceptualizing their organizations’ financial distress as
legal problems, perhaps attorneys should be encouraged to intervene earlier
during the churches’ financial declines. If engaged earlier, attorneys may be
able to offer solutions better tailored to the situations, including legal options
besides bankruptcy.
On average, however, the most productive solution may be the status
quo—that is, leaders initially experiencing their churches’ impending financial
collapse as private or social problems. Affording creditors the power to turn
their organizations’ financial problems into legal problems may provide
religious organizations goodwill with their creditors. This goodwill may foster
a more productive negotiating environment, both outside and during
bankruptcy. Bringing legal solutions into the initial mix of options may be
detrimental. Future explorations of the “demand side” of law should consider
whether the consequences of how people, particularly within organizations,
experience and respond to their civil justice problems counsel against
disrupting the natural social construction of problems.

B. Enduring Stigma and Recognizing Shame
Focusing on bankruptcy, the study’s results provide insights that bear upon
debates about the effect of bankruptcy’s stigma, or increasing supposed lack of
stigma, on consumer bankruptcy filing rates.283 As detailed in Part II, theories
regarding social spillover and social capital seek to explain how individuals’
interactions with members of their communities influence bankruptcy filing
rates.284 Empirical evidence links social spillovers and capital with regional
281 See supra Parts IV.A, C.
282 See supra Part II.B.
283 See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
284 See supra Part II.C.
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fluctuations in filing rates and suggests that in some circumstances, social
networks and context may decrease stigma.285 But the studies often do not
disentangle the effect of increased awareness about the bankruptcy process
from the effect of decreasing stigma.286 Those studies that attempt to separate
the two effects preliminarily suggest that more knowledge may explain a
greater portion of bankruptcy trends.287
The results of the interviews offer additional evidence regarding the
effects of social networks on bankruptcy filings. Social networks impacted
religious organizations’ chapter 11 filings.288 Leaders approached trusted
contacts in their social circles and neighborhoods both to learn about
bankruptcy in general and to discuss the stigma attached to filing.289 Social
networks may play a similar role in other bankruptcy filings, including those
of smaller businesses, particularly given that research shows social networks
influence how people understand their problems and how business leaders
decide to adopt legal and other innovations.290
Bankruptcy also remains stigmatized, at least in the eyes of the religious
organizations’ leaders interviewed, and even in light of discussions with other
pastors whose own organizations had filed under chapter 11.291 This provides
support for hypotheses that bankruptcy’s stigma has remained steady, if not
increased, over past decades and remains a barrier to filing.292
Further, the study’s results are significant to disentangling social
networks’ information effects from changes in perceptions of bankruptcy’s
stigma. Interviewed leaders’ perceptions of bankruptcy’s stigma did not
dissipate meaningfully after they talked with others about the propriety of
using chapter 11 to deal with financial distress. Rather, discussions with others
helped the leaders confirm the severity of their organizations’ financial
285 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
286 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
287 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
288 Because the religious organization leaders interviewed are from churches that

ultimately decided to seek to reorganize, the results do not indicate whether the overall
impact of discussions with personal contacts and perceptions of social norms in geographic
areas is to increase an individual’s or an organization’s propensity to file.
289 See supra Part IV.B.
290 See supra Parts II.A, C.
291 See supra Part IV.C.
292 Compare Sullivan et al., supra note 61, at 214–15 (concluding that the data
presented “are far more consistent with the hypothesis that increased filings result from
increased financial distress, and they hint that, despite loud claims to the contrary, the
stigma of bankruptcy may actually be increasing”), with Buckley & Brinig, supra note 75,
at 188 (discussing theories of the causes of increasing consumer bankruptcy filings and
presenting evidence that rising filing rates partially are caused by “a shift in social norms”).
The differences between these perspectives ultimately lead to disagreements about
restricting consumers’ access to bankruptcy. See Mann, supra note 71, at 404–10 (detailing
this debate). The most significant culmination of this debate was BAPCPA’s amendments
to the Code. See supra notes 61–64 and accompanying text.
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situations and solidify their decisions that they had to alter their responses to
their creditors if their congregations were to survive.293 Though leaders’
perceptions of bankruptcy necessarily were altered with increased information,
they ultimately filed despite the stigma. That perceptions of stigma did not
diminish significantly even after filing is evident in leaders’ statements
explaining that chapter 11 was the only option,294 and in their justifications for
their churches’ filings,295 including recharacterizing the filings as
“reorganization” or “restructuring” rather than as the more common (and more
stigmatized) term “bankruptcy.”296
As hypothesized previously,297 social networks’ effects on religious
organizations’ bankruptcy filings thereby operated on two levels—information
dissemination and perceptions regarding stigma—that did not necessarily
always occur at the same time or to the same degree. This result suggests that
social networks even could increase bankruptcy’s stigma while disseminating
information.298 Because only leaders who ultimately decided to place their
churches into reorganization participated in this study, the data does not
provide evidence regarding the overall effect of social networks on
bankruptcy’s stigma. Nonetheless, in future debates about the role of
opportunistic behavior in driving bankruptcy filings, additional inquiries into
the continued force of bankruptcy’s stigma are necessary before basing
legislative and policy decisions on perceptions of a decline in stigma’s effects
as increasing individuals’ propensity to use bankruptcy.299
Moreover, how the interviewed leaders discussed the social and personal
effects of their religious organizations’ chapter 11 cases shows that more
attention likewise should be paid to disentangling the outward stigmatization
of bankruptcy from the internal shame of filing.300 Feelings of stigmatization
and of shame operated in tandem for some leaders, while other leaders focused
primarily on bankruptcy’s stigma or on bankruptcy’s shame.301 Even if the
stigma of filing for bankruptcy has decreased in recent decades, it is not clear
that the shame of filing has decreased as much or at all. If shame reduces the
propensity to file in the same way as stigma, then shame alone, absent stigma,
may inhibit some individuals from filing, rendering inquiries about
bankruptcy’s continued stigma incomplete to determine how perceptions of
bankruptcy impact filings.

293 See supra Part IV.C.
294 See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
295 See supra Part IV.D.
296 See supra notes 253–61 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
298 See also Mann, supra note 71, at 409 (“The increased awareness is likely to affect a

large number of people, of whom only a small number choose to file.”).
299 See supra note 292.
300 See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text.
301 See supra Part IV.C.
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Questioning how the stigma and shame of bankruptcy affect filings also
may not be the most telling inquiry. The act of filing may bring closure to
years of struggling to repay debts.302 But not feeling stigmatized by or
shameful about filing for bankruptcy does not mean that people do not feel
stigmatized by or shameful about their long-term inability to repay their debts.
Rather, leaders seemed to struggle to find a way to repay the money their
churches owed before turning to bankruptcy as a final solution.303
Individuals and leaders of small businesses similarly may attach stigma
and shame to their general inabilities to pay back money they borrowed. This
stigma and shame may be vastly more important in postponing bankruptcy
filings while people try for years to repay their debts. Though this interview
data does not provide evidence of how individuals and business leaders
generally view the propriety of not repaying debt, in the future, distinguishing
between stigma and shame, both as it regards bankruptcy and as it regards the
taking on and repaying of debts more generally, will enhance our
understanding of how and when individuals turn to bankruptcy. Thus, again,
clearer consideration of how people approach debt is needed before legislative
and policy decisions are based on bankruptcy’s supposed declining stigma.

VI. CONCLUSION
Analyzing how religious organizations think about financial distress in
general and bankruptcy in particular is not a straightforward or simple task.
But how their leaders initially conceptualize their organizations’ financial
problems and how they come to the legal system provide key insights into
longstanding questions about how people and organizations decide to use the
legal system. Leaders may not view their organizations’ issues as legal and
they may integrate how they think of themselves into how they think about
their organizations’ problems. Both possibilities are worthy of future study.
The Article also offers additional, more nuanced evidence of how people
think about filing for bankruptcy and repaying their debts. This evidence is
significant to debates about consumer and small business bankruptcy policy.
Leaders’ articulations of how they felt about placing their religious
organizations in bankruptcy and taking out debt indicate that continuing to
disentangle the effects of stigma and shame on the decision to file, as well as
on people’s reactions to the inability to repay debt may reveal valuable
insights into when and why consumers, small business owners, and smaller
organizations turn to bankruptcy.

302 See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
303 This partially is evident in the fact that leaders first turned to nonlegal remedies to

address their churches’ financial issues. See supra Part IV.A.

